School choice with incomplete preferences
How to cite
Liu, Siru. 2025. "School choice with incomplete preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015812. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15812-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Current school choice models, such as the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) and the Top Trading Cycle (TTC) mechanisms, require students to submit ranked lists of schools. This study introduces a novel preference elicitation method that allows students to express indecision between schools through pairwise comparisons. I develop a method for completing the matching process when students report incomplete preferences and use lab experiments to study the welfare outcomes.
Intervention
The intervention in this experiment consists of two matching mechanisms and the option for subjects to express indecision in school matching tasks.
Stage 1: Subjects will be asked three questions to compare three schools pairwisely.
Stage 2: In each treatment, subjects will be randomly assigned to groups of three, and answer the school comparison questions again to complete the school matching tasks.
Experimental design
This experiment design varies the mechanisms and indecision expression. The two mechanisms being studied are the DA and TTC mechanisms, while indecision expression is whether subjects are given the option "cannot compare the two" in school comparison questions. Each experiment session consists of two parts: Part 1 elicits subjects’ preferences for schools; Part 2 contains four treatments of school choice decisions: DA-O, DA-P, TTC-O and TTC-P.
Part 1 is the same in all experiment sessions, including two rounds of pairwise comparisons of three schools. In each round, subjects will be shown a school payoff table and asked three questions to compare schools. The purpose of Part 1 is to elicit subjects’ preferences on school pairs for welfare analysis.
Part 2 includes multiple rounds of school choice decisions. In the first half rounds, each student’s school payoff table is the same as the table in the first round in Part 1; in the second half rounds, each student’s school payoff table is the same as the table in the second round in Part 1. In each round of school choice decision, students are randomly grouped into three. There are three schools and three students in each group. Schools’ priority information is shared with all students in the group. Prior to making school choice decisions, students will be informed about the matching algorithm and provided with an example for clarity.
Design details
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