School choice with incomplete preferences

How to cite

Liu, Siru. 2025. "School choice with incomplete preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015812. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15812-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Siru Liu*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015812
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15812-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-04-14 – 2025-05-15
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C92 C78 I20
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15812

Abstract

Current school choice models, such as the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) and the Top Trading Cycle (TTC) mechanisms, require students to submit ranked lists of schools. This study introduces a novel preference elicitation method that allows students to express indecision between schools through pairwise comparisons. I develop a method for completing the matching process when students report incomplete preferences and use lab experiments to study the welfare outcomes.

Intervention

The intervention in this experiment consists of two matching mechanisms and the option for subjects to express indecision in school matching tasks.
Stage 1: Subjects will be asked three questions to compare three schools pairwisely.
Stage 2: In each treatment, subjects will be randomly assigned to groups of three, and answer the school comparison questions again to complete the school matching tasks.

Experimental design

This experiment design varies the mechanisms and indecision expression. The two mechanisms being studied are the DA and TTC mechanisms, while indecision expression is whether subjects are given the option "cannot compare the two" in school comparison questions. Each experiment session consists of two parts: Part 1 elicits subjects’ preferences for schools; Part 2 contains four treatments of school choice decisions: DA-O, DA-P, TTC-O and TTC-P.
Part 1 is the same in all experiment sessions, including two rounds of pairwise comparisons of three schools. In each round, subjects will be shown a school payoff table and asked three questions to compare schools. The purpose of Part 1 is to elicit subjects’ preferences on school pairs for welfare analysis.
Part 2 includes multiple rounds of school choice decisions. In the first half rounds, each student’s school payoff table is the same as the table in the first round in Part 1; in the second half rounds, each student’s school payoff table is the same as the table in the second round in Part 1. In each round of school choice decision, students are randomly grouped into three. There are three schools and three students in each group. Schools’ priority information is shared with all students in the group. Prior to making school choice decisions, students will be informed about the matching algorithm and provided with an example for clarity.

Design details

Randomization method
Recruiting emails are randomly sent to undergraduate students who registered with the experimental economics center at Georgia State University. And subjects are randomly assigned to a treatment at the beginning of each experiment session.
Randomization unit
Experiment sessions
Clusters
About 12 experiment sessions
Observations
About 300 undergraduate subjects
Arms
About 66 undergraduate subjects per treatment
Primary outcomes
Students' answers to school comparison questions in both stages, and the stability and efficiency in matching results.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords