Eco-Effective Policy Incentives for Extended Producer Responsibility - Experimental Evidence
How to cite
Walkowitz, Gari; Erdmann, Maximilian Vincent. 2025. "Eco-Effective Policy Incentives for Extended Producer Responsibility - Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015781. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15781-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is an environmental policy strategy that aims to make producers responsible for the waste management of their products and packaging across the entire life cycle. Within this policy, different types of "eco-modulation" are discussed as incentive strategies by governmental institutions aiming to improve the sustainability of the eco-design of firms’ products. Using a large-scale behavioral experiment, we study the effectiveness of different incentive strategies regarding the environmental outcome, the firms’ profit, and the regulators’ revenue. The experimental method enables us to systematically investigate under controlled conditions how producers behaviorally respond to potential changes in the provided incentive structure and the underlying psychological mechanisms. As part of an ex-ante policy assessment, we present recommendations on how producers can be informed to improve eco-design. We suggest that the incentive strategies under discussion and their impact on the actual environmental outcome need to be closely and carefully scrutinized.
Intervention
In an online behavioral experiment, participants decide how a product should be designed. This includes two choices regarding 1) the eco-design and 2) the weight of the product.
In the baseline treatment, participants can choose between a higher monetary reward and a higher reduction of CO2 emissions. In treatments 2-5, we additionally introduce and test different types of policy interventions:
In treatment 2, lighter product designs are rewarded monetarily.
In treatment 3, a monetary bonus is granted if the best eco-design is chosen.
In treatment 4, a monetary penalty is imposed if the best eco-design is not chosen.
In treatment 5, the more sustainable the eco-design, the higher the monetary reward.
Experimental design
The participants decide how to design a product. This includes two choices regarding 1) the eco-design level (1, most unsustainable but most profitable - 3, most sustainable but most unprofitable) and 2) the weight (1, lightest - 3, heaviest) of the product. The combination of 3 (eco-design level) x 3 (weight level) results in 9 possible product designs that participants can choose from.
The choices of the participants affect their personal monetary earnings and how much CO2 emissions are reduced. Each participant can reduce a minimum of 86.96 kg of CO2 and a maximum of 260,88 kg of CO2. CO2 reduction is achieved through the purchase of Gold Standard verified emission certificates.
In contrast to the baseline treatment, participants in treatments 2-5 make these choices additionally under incentives induced by policy intervention schemes.
The experiment will be conducted online.
Design details
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