Eco-Effective Policy Incentives for Extended Producer Responsibility - Experimental Evidence

How to cite

Walkowitz, Gari; Erdmann, Maximilian Vincent. 2025. "Eco-Effective Policy Incentives for Extended Producer Responsibility - Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015781. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15781-1.0

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Gari Walkowitz* , Maximilian Vincent Erdmann

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015781
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15781-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-04-22 – 2025-06-27
Countries
Germany (Saxony)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15781

Abstract

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is an environmental policy strategy that aims to make producers responsible for the waste management of their products and packaging across the entire life cycle. Within this policy, different types of "eco-modulation" are discussed as incentive strategies by governmental institutions aiming to improve the sustainability of the eco-design of firms’ products. Using a large-scale behavioral experiment, we study the effectiveness of different incentive strategies regarding the environmental outcome, the firms’ profit, and the regulators’ revenue. The experimental method enables us to systematically investigate under controlled conditions how producers behaviorally respond to potential changes in the provided incentive structure and the underlying psychological mechanisms. As part of an ex-ante policy assessment, we present recommendations on how producers can be informed to improve eco-design. We suggest that the incentive strategies under discussion and their impact on the actual environmental outcome need to be closely and carefully scrutinized.

Intervention

In an online behavioral experiment, participants decide how a product should be designed. This includes two choices regarding 1) the eco-design and 2) the weight of the product.

In the baseline treatment, participants can choose between a higher monetary reward and a higher reduction of CO2 emissions. In treatments 2-5, we additionally introduce and test different types of policy interventions:
In treatment 2, lighter product designs are rewarded monetarily.
In treatment 3, a monetary bonus is granted if the best eco-design is chosen.
In treatment 4, a monetary penalty is imposed if the best eco-design is not chosen.
In treatment 5, the more sustainable the eco-design, the higher the monetary reward.

Experimental design

The participants decide how to design a product. This includes two choices regarding 1) the eco-design level (1, most unsustainable but most profitable - 3, most sustainable but most unprofitable) and 2) the weight (1, lightest - 3, heaviest) of the product. The combination of 3 (eco-design level) x 3 (weight level) results in 9 possible product designs that participants can choose from.

The choices of the participants affect their personal monetary earnings and how much CO2 emissions are reduced. Each participant can reduce a minimum of 86.96 kg of CO2 and a maximum of 260,88‬ kg of CO2. CO2 reduction is achieved through the purchase of Gold Standard verified emission certificates.

In contrast to the baseline treatment, participants in treatments 2-5 make these choices additionally under incentives induced by policy intervention schemes.

The experiment will be conducted online.

Design details

Randomization method
The experiment will be conducted online. Treatment assignment is randomized on the individual level. Treatments are randomly assigned to individual subjects by cycling through the treatments in the order of which subjects participate in the experiment.
Randomization unit
We randomize at the level of the individual: • Treatment assignment (treatment 1 – treatment 5)
Clusters
320 Individuals, fluent in English with management and decision-making experience from European countries.
Observations
320 Individuals, fluent in English with management and decision-making experience from European countries = 320 observations.
Arms
Each treatment will include 64 participants, i.e., we will collect 64 observations per treatment. In total, we will collect 5 x 64 = 320 observations.
Primary outcomes
The study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of different incentive strategies in relation to the chosen eco-design, with respect to: • the environmental impact, measured by the real reduction of CO2 emissions • the firms’ profitability, reflected in the monetary rewards received by participants • the regulator’s revenue, represented by the amount and structure of the fee
Secondary outcomes
After the experiment, we will administer a questionnaire to collect additional information on the subjects’: • personal values (PVQ, Schwartz 2012), • economic preferences (Falk et al. 2018), • and socio-economic background

Cited by

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Keywords