Insuring Against Extreme Heat: A Randomised Evaluation
How to cite
Simpson, Pol; Jalal, Amen; Zou, Eddy; Pople, Ashley. 2025. "Insuring Against Extreme Heat: A Randomised Evaluation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015728. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15728-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This randomised evaluation tests whether a novel parametric heat insurance scheme can protect informal workers in India from the costs of extreme heat. The intervention, developed by the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), provides automatic daily wage payments to informal workers when local temperatures exceed predetermined thresholds. In partnership with SEWA, we implement a village-level cluster-randomized encouragement design, where SEWA grassroot leaders are incentivized to focus recruitment efforts in randomly selected “priority” villages, whereas control villages receive no directed outreach. We measure the impact on heat-adaptive behaviours, financial coping strategies, and welfare (inc. physical and mental health). We examine heterogeneity in these effects (e.g. by occupation, prior exposure to heat, and access to financial buffers) and explore how impacts vary with the number of insurance payments received. The study also investigates willingness to pay and perceptions of climate insurance, with the aim of informing scalable, climate-responsive social protection.
Intervention
This trial studies parametric heat insurance, which provides automatic daily wage payments to informal workers when the local temperature exceeds predetermined thresholds. These payments are delivered automatically to member's bank accounts after the shock.
Experimental design
The experiment uses a randomised encouragement design to identify the causal impact of parametric heat insurance. All eligible SEWA members can enrol, but grassroots leaders are incentivised to focus recruitment efforts only in randomly selected treatment villages (n = 2,815). Control villages (n = 2,816) receive no directed outreach. This generates exogenous variation in exposure to programme information and thus take-up.
We will estimate ITT and TOT effects using village-level treatment assignment as an instrument for individual participation. Additional analysis will use a regression discontinuity design around temperature thresholds that trigger payouts, exploiting sharp cutoffs in daily temperature records to estimate causal effects of receiving payouts.
We will test for heterogeneity by occupation, access to credit / savings, income, education, household composition, age, pre-existing health conditions, market and healthcare access, access to adaptive resources and treatment intensity (number of payments received).
Design details
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