Eliciting Preferences for Redistribution in the Presence of Evasion
How to cite
Eldrup, Magnus. 2025. "Eliciting Preferences for Redistribution in the Presence of Evasion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015719. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15719-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We use a survey inspired by Okun’s leaky bucket experiment to study how people make redistribution choices when faced with trade-offs. The results shed light on attitudes toward fairness and may help inform tax policy in contexts with informal employment. The study takes place in Kenya.
Intervention
The survey asks people to make redistribution choices when faced with trade-offs such that redistribution is costly.
Respondents are randomly assigned to one of two framings: (1) a gain-gain framing (T1), where both recipients benefit from the allocation, or (2) a loss frame (T2), where the endowment is initially given to the richer recipient and may be redistributed.
The social welfare weights are subsequently used in optimal tax simulations for Kenya.
Experimental design
The survey uses costly redistribution to elicit MSWWs.
Two framings (T1 gain-gain, T2 transfer-loss) are randomly assigned. Respondents make continuous allocation decisions under conditions with income inequality or tax non-compliance.
Design details
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