Motivating social compliance in a multi-tier supply chain framework: Experimental evidence on the role of framing and financial incentives

How to cite

Grabher-Meyer, Nikita; Patel, Amrish; Borcan, Oana; Turocy, Thedore. 2025. "Motivating social compliance in a multi-tier supply chain framework: Experimental evidence on the role of framing and financial incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015674. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15674-2.1

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Nikita Grabher-Meyer* , Amrish Patel , Oana Borcan , Thedore Turocy

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015674
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15674-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-03-30 – 2026-03-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15674

Abstract

The 2013 Rana Plaza collapse exposed the limits of private regulatory models that rely on multinational corporations to enforce supplier codes of conduct through audits. In today’s complex, multi-tier global supply chains, lead firms often lack visibility beyond their direct suppliers, where the most severe labor violations tend to occur. To manage reputational and financial risks, buyers increasingly delegate the task of monitoring sub-suppliers to first-tier suppliers, who face competing pressures to reduce costs while ensuring social compliance. This study examines how perceptions of fairness and reciprocity influence first-tier suppliers’ efforts to uphold labor standards within their own operations and among sub-suppliers. We implement a novel online experiment with over 500 South African participants, simulating a three-tier supply chain with a lead firm (Alpha), a first-tier supplier (Beta), and a second-tier supplier (Gamma). Participants assigned to Beta are randomly allocated to one of three treatment conditions that vary the framing of Alpha’s compliance demands and the presence of financial incentives. We test whether Beta increases monitoring of Gamma and improves compliance when Alpha adopts a more collaborative, procedurally fair approach, with and without monetary incentives.

Intervention

This study investigates how different communication strategies from a lead firm (buyer) affect supplier compliance behaviour within a stylized, multi-tier global supply chain. Specifically, we examine how variations in the framing of compliance expectations – focusing on collaboration, procedural fairness, and the presence or absence of monetary incentives – influence suppliers’ compliance decisions. The intervention manipulates the tone and content of compliance messages from the buyer to assess their effects on two key outcomes: the supplier’s effort to monitor upstream subcontractors and their own compliance performance.

Experimental design

We conduct a randomized online experiment with participants drawn from the general working population in a country representative of sourcing environments. Each participant takes on the role of a first-tier supplier responsible for allocating limited time across production, compliance, and monitoring tasks. Participants are randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions, which vary how compliance expectations are communicated by the lead firm. The treatment arms differ in message framing (traditional vs. collaborative) and in the inclusion of a monetary incentive for reporting non-compliance by subcontractors. To ensure consistency and realism, decisions made by upstream and downstream actors (e.g., the buyer or subcontractor) are collected in advance and matched to participants ex post during the main experiment. Randomization is implemented by Prolific at the individual level, with equal probability of assignment to any treatment group.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomisation is implemented by Prolific, and participants have an equal probability to be assigned to any treatment group.
Randomization unit
The primary unit of randomisation is the individual participant.
Clusters
N/A
Observations
A total of 561 individuals were recruited via Prolific, 427 of whom played the main role of first-tier suppliers.
Arms
Approximately 135-145 individuals per treatment arm (136 individuals in control, 144 individuals in treatment with framing only, 147 individuals in treatment with both framing and monetary incentive).
Primary outcomes
Participants are assigned the role of a first-tier supplier responsible for: 1) Completing a production task; 2) Ensuring compliance with labor standards, and 3) Choosing how much effort to invest in monitoring their upstream subcontractors. We define two primary outcome measures: 1) Monitoring effort, measured as the number of seconds the participant allocates to subcontractor inspection, as determined by their selected inspection policy; 2) Compliance performance, measured by the number of correctly transcribed items in a compliance-focused (transcription) task.
Secondary outcomes
To investigate potential mechanisms, we will measure participants’ perceptions of fairness in relation to the compliance expectations communicated by the buyer. This will be assessed post-task using a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 10 (“completely agree”) in response to a statement regarding perceived fairness. This outcome helps evaluate whether collaborative framing alters suppliers’ normative responses.

Cited by

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Keywords