Motivating social compliance in a multi-tier supply chain framework: Experimental evidence on the role of framing and financial incentives
How to cite
Grabher-Meyer, Nikita; Patel, Amrish; Borcan, Oana; Turocy, Thedore. 2025. "Motivating social compliance in a multi-tier supply chain framework: Experimental evidence on the role of framing and financial incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015674. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15674-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The 2013 Rana Plaza collapse exposed the limits of private regulatory models that rely on multinational corporations to enforce supplier codes of conduct through audits. In today’s complex, multi-tier global supply chains, lead firms often lack visibility beyond their direct suppliers, where the most severe labor violations tend to occur. To manage reputational and financial risks, buyers increasingly delegate the task of monitoring sub-suppliers to first-tier suppliers, who face competing pressures to reduce costs while ensuring social compliance. This study examines how perceptions of fairness and reciprocity influence first-tier suppliers’ efforts to uphold labor standards within their own operations and among sub-suppliers. We implement a novel online experiment with over 500 South African participants, simulating a three-tier supply chain with a lead firm (Alpha), a first-tier supplier (Beta), and a second-tier supplier (Gamma). Participants assigned to Beta are randomly allocated to one of three treatment conditions that vary the framing of Alpha’s compliance demands and the presence of financial incentives. We test whether Beta increases monitoring of Gamma and improves compliance when Alpha adopts a more collaborative, procedurally fair approach, with and without monetary incentives.
Intervention
This study investigates how different communication strategies from a lead firm (buyer) affect supplier compliance behaviour within a stylized, multi-tier global supply chain. Specifically, we examine how variations in the framing of compliance expectations – focusing on collaboration, procedural fairness, and the presence or absence of monetary incentives – influence suppliers’ compliance decisions. The intervention manipulates the tone and content of compliance messages from the buyer to assess their effects on two key outcomes: the supplier’s effort to monitor upstream subcontractors and their own compliance performance.
Experimental design
We conduct a randomized online experiment with participants drawn from the general working population in a country representative of sourcing environments. Each participant takes on the role of a first-tier supplier responsible for allocating limited time across production, compliance, and monitoring tasks. Participants are randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions, which vary how compliance expectations are communicated by the lead firm. The treatment arms differ in message framing (traditional vs. collaborative) and in the inclusion of a monetary incentive for reporting non-compliance by subcontractors. To ensure consistency and realism, decisions made by upstream and downstream actors (e.g., the buyer or subcontractor) are collected in advance and matched to participants ex post during the main experiment. Randomization is implemented by Prolific at the individual level, with equal probability of assignment to any treatment group.
Design details
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