Decomposing Partisan Optimism
How to cite
Paaso, Mikael; Okat, Deniz; Torstila, Sami. 2025. "Decomposing Partisan Optimism." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015652. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15652-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This trial is related to another registered trial (AEARCTR-0015646) in that we use the same survey: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15646
This trial is related to an existing project based on observational data, which we are now supplementing with experimental data (this pre-registration relates to the experimental analysis).
Previous research has documented that people tend to be more optimistic in their economic decision-making when the party they support is in power. However, it is not clear whether this effect is driven by "blind party loyalty" or the fact that people tend to vote for parties whose economic policies they agree with. We test these theories in the context of the investment decisions of Finnish entrepreneurs. Using observational data on entrepreneurs running for municipal council seats, we have shown that Finnish entrepreneurs invest more when the party they support holds a greater share of seats in government, but that this effect is driven by ideological alignment on the economic dimension.
Now we plan to extend this analysis using a survey of 1000 Finnish SMEs (mainly owner-managed ones). The goal of this experiment is twofold: First, to provide external validity to our analysis on observational data. Second, to shown in an experimental context that our effects are not driven by differences in economic performance between right-wing and left-wing governments.
We first collect data on the party alignment and ideological views of Finnish entrepreneurs using similar measures of ideology as in our previous analysis. We then run regressions of investment on the share of seats in the government held by the entrepreneur's preferred party and ideological distance (on economic and social dimensions) between the entrepreneur and the government.
Next, in the experimental part of the paper, we perform two analyses. First, we present participants with one hypothetical government composition and ask whether, if this government took power in 2027 (next parliamentary elections in Finland) their expectations about the economy and investment plans would change. We can then regress planned investment on both ideological distance to the government as well as whether one's preferred party is included in it. We also perform a conjoint analysis (primarily for the other project mentioned above on public debt) where the governing coalition is one randomized feature.
Experimental design
We have two experiments which essentially test the same thing.
We first solicit a set of economic expectations and investment plans from each participant prior to treatment.
Hypothetical government composition: Participants are presented with a randomized hypothetical future government for Finland (a list of parties) and are asked to imagine that the next government consists of these parties. There is no traditional control group here, instead, the randomization means that each participant receives a random "future government" they have to imagine. The lists of parties are made up of somewhat plausible combinations of parties that might govern Finland in the next elections. We then ask about whether their economic expectations for 2030 (5 years from now) and investment plans change if this government takes office in 2027 (next elections).
We then run a conjoint experiment which we are also using for another project (see project description for link to pre-registration). In this, we show participants two hypothetical states of the economy in the future in which various features (GDP per capita, prev. year GDP growth, prev. year inflation, several tax rates, government composition, debt-to-GDP) are randomized. Participants are presented with 5 sets of 2 states-of-the-world and have to choose which one is more conducive to investment.
We plan to study whether a) people report more optimistic expectations and investment plans when the party they support is part of the ruling coalition and b) whether ideological distance on the economic dimension (measured using parties' ideological position from the 2021 parliamentary elections) explains this.
For apportioning ideology across parties in our hypothetical governments, we will assume that, if we present participants with a 3-party coalition, the largest party will hold 25% of seats in parliament, the second largest will hold 20% and the third 18%. In case of a 4-party coalition, we will apportion seats 22.5%-20%-10%-10% and in case of a 5-party coalition, 20%-18%-15%-10%-5%
Design details
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