Flexible Work Arrangements, Labor Supply and Firm Outcomes

How to cite

Chandra, Shreya. 2025. "Flexible Work Arrangements, Labor Supply and Firm Outcomes." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015588. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15588-1.1

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Shreya Chandra*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015588
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15588-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-11-25 – 2025-05-10
Countries
India (Tamil Nadu)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15588

Abstract

A recent literature emphasizes the role of workers’ preferences for flexibility in explaining the prevalence of self-employment or casual work over wage-work in developing countries. While flexibility is an important job attribute for workers, flexible work arrangements may not always work for firms, particularly in settings that demand greater coordination among worker tasks (e.g, team production). In this project, I study the impact of regular labor supply and increased worker coordination on worker and firm level productivity in the context of a large apparel manufacturing cluster in India. The status quo work arrangement in these firms is that workers (tailors) choose their own work timings, despite clear gains to both workers and firms of coordinating work times. Such flexibility slows the overall speed of production by limiting the extent of task specialization among workers. I propose to work with a sample of small firms (5-15 workers) and their workers, and will incentivize all workers in treatment firms to come to work at the same time for a period of 4-weeks. Workers in treatment firms will either receive a high or a low incentive, allowing me to estimate workers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for flexibility by observing daily compliance at different bonus amounts. Detailed data on daily production at the worker and firm level will allow me to estimate the effects of increased worker coordination on firm level outcomes such as output, profits, revenues, costs, and order characteristics.

Experimental design

Firms will be randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups - (A) 4-week treatment (50%), and (C) Control (50%). The treatment group will be further randomized into (A1) high (75% of treatment firms) and (A2) low incentive (25%) sub-treatments, with daily bonus amounts set at Rs. 100 (high) and Rs. 50 (low) respectively. These amounts are approximately 15% and 7.5% of worker’s average daily earnings.

Treatment incentives are conditional on the worker arriving at the firm and starting work by the company’s preferred start time (elicited at baseline). Thus, the incentive encourages both on-time arrival and attendance. The total incentive amount will be added to workers’ weekly earnings (the status quo pay frequency), and payments will be made close to the usual pay-day (end of the week). All workers in the firm are eligible for the same daily incentive amount but final payouts will differ based on individual compliance during the study period.

Workers in control firms will receive unconditional incentives for the same period, matched to a randomly chosen low treatment firm each week to address concerns about income effects on worker productivity. Given the smaller proportion of low treatment firms, multiple control firms will be matched to a single low-treatment firm. These (randomized) groupings will be made separately for each week.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer. Phase 1 randomization was unstratified. Phase 2 randomization was stratified on baseline level of coordination in worker arrival times with respect to the owner's preferred start time, as elicited at baseline.
Randomization unit
Firm level.
Clusters
100 firms.
Observations
100 firms, 700 workers (assuming on average 7 workers per firm), - This project involves daily data collection on worker attendance and production for a 6-week period, ie 36 days per firm/worker. 24 out of 36 days are incentive work days, the remaining are pre-incentives days. - Worker compliance, attendance, work hours and production outcomes will be at the worker-day level (25,000 worker days) - Firm output and profits will be computed weekly (600 firm-weeks) as well as overall (100 firms)
Arms
50 treatment firms, 50 control firms.
Primary outcomes
- Worker compliance, attendance, work hours, production output and earnings (daily and weekly) - Worker productivity (weekly) - Firm level coordination among workers (daily) - Firm level production output (daily and weekly) - Firm level profits, revenues (weekly)

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Keywords