Students' Preferences Over Penalties for Wrong Answers

How to cite

Castagnetti, Alessandro; Levati, Vittoria; Zarri, Luca. 2025. "Students' Preferences Over Penalties for Wrong Answers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015574. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15574-1.0

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Alessandro Castagnetti* , Vittoria Levati , Luca Zarri

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015574
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15574-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-04-29 – 2026-05-01
Countries
Private
JEL codes
A2, D910
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15574

Abstract

Multiple-choice exams are widely used in educational settings, whether during course exams or university admissions, carrying important implications on how students are evaluated. A critical evaluators’ dilemma is whether or not to impose penalties for wrong answers. On the one hand, penalties can discourage students from guessing; on the other hand, they tend to disproportionately disadvantage female test-takers, who are found to be more loss-averse than males. The latter finding has been conducive to policy proposals aimed to address and reduce the gender gap in questions skipped. However, little is known about students’ preferences regarding exam penalties, specifically related to both competitive and non-competitive environments, and about how these preferences depend on relevant personal characteristics such as ability, confidence, and gender. To address these questions, we propose a novel experimental design in which we elicit students’ preferences over imposing penalties for wrong answers. We will assess these preferences in both competitive and non-competitive environments.

Experimental design

The main goal of the research is to analyze students' preferences regarding penalties for incorrect answers, taking into account relevant factors, namely:
1. The rules of the environment (competition vs. no competition) during the test.
2. The difficulty level of the test.
Therefore, we will examine how these factors influence students' preferences for penalties on wrong answers.

Design details

Randomization method
Otree software
Randomization unit
Individual level.
Clusters
400 individuals
Observations
400 individuals
Arms
400 individuals: 100 Competition, Difficult version IQ 100 Competition, Easy version IQ 100 No competition, Difficult version IQ 100 No competition, Easy version IQ
Primary outcomes
Willingness to pay/accept over penalties for wrong answers
Secondary outcomes
1. Belief updating. 2. IQ score and number of questions left unanswered.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords