Messaging after a Bank Failure: Messaging Strategies to Stop Contagion

How to cite

Pigeon, Marc-Andre; Yang, Yang. 2025. "Messaging after a Bank Failure: Messaging Strategies to Stop Contagion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015570. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15570-1.0

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Marc-Andre Pigeon* , Yang Yang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015570
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15570-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-04-07 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
E10; E42; G18; G21; G28
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15570

Abstract

Policymakers often confront situations in which policy effectiveness hinges on appropriate strategic communications. We propose to employ a between-subject survey experiment conducted with depositors in the United States and Canada to test different messaging strategies in the context of a bank failure caused by a deposit run. The survey experiment will be conducted online between April and May 2025, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four messaging conditions. We expect to find that in both countries, messages that convey policy certainty - commitments to effectively offer unlimited deposit insurance - will be most effective in halting the spread of the deposit run. We expect this finding to be especially pronounced in the United States given its long history of repeated bank failures; we expect a similar but more modest result for Canada, which has not had any bank failures in decades.

Intervention

We propose to employ a between-subject survey experiment with depositors in the United States and Canada to test different messaging strategies in the context of a bank failure caused by a deposit run. The survey experiment will be conducted online between April and May 2025, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four messaging conditions.

Experimental design

The experiment will begin by explaining the concept of a deposit run. It will then asked subjects to imagine that a deposit run caused a bank to fail. We will then randomly assign subjects to four messaging conditions (including one control and three treatments). Each treatment provides one additional piece of information (relative to the control). The messaging conditions map to different government communications strategies in context of a bank failure caused by bank run.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization by survey firm algorithm.
Randomization unit
This is a survey of individuals. Individuals will be randomly allocated to one of four treatments (including control).
Clusters
2400 individuals per jurisdiction (United States, Canada).
Observations
2400 individuals in each jurisdiction (United States; Canada)
Arms
In each jurisdiction (US, Canada): 600 for passive ("control"); 600 for information-only messaging ("DI-Info"); 600 for conditional support for uninsured depositors ("conditional"); and 600 for unconditional commitment ("unconditional").
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome variables is 'worry.' It captures the extent to which the interventions (different messaging strategies) attenuate or aggravate worry about having access to money relative to the passive (say nothing) control.
Secondary outcomes
The secondary outcome is withdrawal behaviour - given their level of worry, (a) will respondents withdraw their money from their banking institution and (b) if they choose to move it, where would they move it to? Another secondary outcome is whether respondents choose to share their decision with others. If they do, we will ask whom they choose to inform and through which channels they communicate their decision.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords