Do election campaigns make leaders more responsible?

How to cite

Iqbal, Muhammad Arslan; Erkal, Nisvan; Kamm, Aaron. 2025. "Do election campaigns make leaders more responsible?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015564. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15564-2.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Muhammad Arslan Iqbal* , Nisvan Erkal , Aaron Kamm

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015564
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15564-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-03-18 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91, D73, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15564

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of campaign promises on the behavior of elected leaders. We use a novel game in which leaders first determine voters’ contributions to a common fund and then decide on their own contribution. Importantly, leaders have the discretion to either contribute to or withdraw from the common fund. Using a laboratory experiment, we study how binding versus non-binding campaign promises in elections influence leaders’ behavior, particularly in terms of opportunism and social responsibility. We further study whether the influence of non-binding campaign promises on leaders' behavior differs when the game is modified so that leaders cannot take from the common fund.

Intervention

We use an asymmetric between-subjects design where the treatments vary on four dimensions. First, the treatments vary whether candidates can campaign on their own contribution to the common fund or not. Second, the treatments vary whether their campaign messages are binding or not. Binding campaign messages are automatically implemented whereas candidates get a chance to revise their campaign message if they are non-binding. Third, the treatments vary whether candidates can take money from the common fund or not. Lastly, treatments also vary whether the tax rate for voters is determined exogenously or by the elected leaders. The experiment will be conducted with participants recruited using ORSEE at the E2MU lab at the University of the Melbourne or Monash University.

Experimental design

In our experiment, participants are randomly assigned to groups of five. Within each group, three participants are assigned the role of voters, while the remaining two are assigned the roles of Candidate. All participants receive an endowment. The candidates in each group send campaign messages to the voters. The campaign messages contain information about the tax amount in treatments where tax amount is determined by the elected leaders. In some treatments, it also includes information about the leader’s contribution to the common fund. The campaign messages may be binding or non-binding, depending on the treatment condition. If the campaign message is binding, its contents are automatically implemented if the candidate is elected to be the leader. After the voters receive the campaign messages from the candidates, they vote for their preferred candidate. While voters are casting their votes, candidates make their final decisions about the tax amount (if applicable and tax campaign is non-binding) and their own contribution to the common fund. Across treatments, the ability to take from the common fund varies. In some treatments, candidates can take money from the common fund during their contribution decision; in others, they cannot. In this stage, we use a strategy method and ask all candidates to state their decisions which are implemented if they are elected to be the leader. The leader is determined by majority voting. The elected leader and all group members receive their initial endowment plus a share of the total common fund whereas the non-elected candidate simply receive their initial endowment.

The participants also complete a survey, which consists of three parts. In Part I, the participants provide feedback on their understanding of the instructions and payoff calculations. They are also asked open-ended questions about the decisions they made during the experiment and their preferences (honesty and guilt aversion). We also elicit beliefs of voters and candidates about the decisions and outcome of the experiment. In Part II, participants are randomly re-grouped into groups of five for a decision-making task. Each participant is asked to split 100 ECU between themselves and the other group members, with the allocated amount being equally distributed among the other four participants. At the end of the session, one participant from each group is randomly selected, and their decision is implemented. In Part III, the participants answer demographic questions, including gender, age, field of study, years in Australia, ethnicity, and past participation in experiments.

In our experiment, we classify three types of leader behaviors. First, if the leader makes a negative contribution to the common fund (i.e., takes form the common fund, the behavior will be classified as embezzlement. Second, if the leader makes a lower positive contribution to the common fund than the tax rate imposed on voters, the behavior will be classified as tax evasion. Finally, if the leader makes a positive contribution that is equal to the tax rate or exceeds it, the behavior will be classified as responsible.

Our main research questions are:
1. Does making campaign promises binding make elected leaders more responsible?
2. What is the impact of making campaign promises binding on voter welfare and total welfare?
3. Do non-binding campaign promises make elected leaders more responsible?
4. What is the impact of non-binding campaign promises on voter welfare and total welfare?
5. Does the influence of non-binding campaign promises on leaders’ behavior increase when embezzlement is not possible relative to when it is?

Design details

Randomization method
Participants will be recruited via email using ORSEE at the University of Melbourne or Monash University. They will choose between a list of available sessions and the session is randomized to a treatment before it is initialized. Roles are randomly assigned by the computer within each session. Depending on the randomized treatment, candidates can either campaign on tax rate alone or both tax rate and their own contribution to the common fund. In some treatments, tax rate is exogenously determined and the leaders can only campaign on their own contribution. Similarly, the treatment will determine whether their campaign messages are binding or not. Furthermore, the treatment will also determine whether the leaders can take money from the common fund or not.
Randomization unit
Treatments are assigned at the session level whereas the roles are randomized at the individual level within a group.
Clusters
780 Participants.
Observations
Based on the power calculations, we need 780 (150 x 3 Treatments + 165 x 2 Treatments) participants in total.
Arms
We plan to run five treatments. For each of first three treatment arms, we plan to run 6 sessions (5 groups or 25 participants within each session). Hence, we plan to recruit 150 participants (or randomly assigned 60 candidates and 90 voters) per treatment arm. For each of last two treatment arms, we plan to run 7 sessions (5 sessions with 25 participants + 2 sessions with 20 participants). Hence we plan to recruit 165 participants (or randomly assigned 66 candidates and 99 voters) per treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
1- Tax Amount stated in the Campaign Message (if applicable) 2- Own Contribution stated in the Campaign Message (if applicable) 3- Actual Tax Amount (if applicable) 4- Actual Own Contribution
Secondary outcomes
1. Elected leader's campaign choices 2. Elected leader's level of promise keeping

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords