Information Avoidance and Ingroup Favoritism: The Case of (Invisible) Vaccination Status
How to cite
Sasaki, Shusaku. 2025. "Information Avoidance and Ingroup Favoritism: The Case of (Invisible) Vaccination Status." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015561. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15561-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Humans are known to exhibit ingroup favoritism, preferring those who share the same identity over those who do not. However, whether an individual belongs to an ingroup or an outgroup is not always immediately evident. While certain characteristics, such as gender or race, can be easily discerned from appearance, others—such as political affiliation or sexual orientation—are less readily observable. In the latter case, real-world opportunities arise for individuals to verify whether another person belongs to their ingroup or outgroup.
This study conducts an experiment that extrapolates such opportunities for verification, examining how individuals utilize these opportunities and how ingroup favoritism changes as a consequence. I investigate this research question in the context of COVID-19 vaccination. A growing body of literature has demonstrated that vaccinated individuals exhibit stronger ingroup favoritism toward other vaccinated individuals compared to the unvaccinated. However, one’s vaccination status is not visually identifiable.
In this study, I construct an environment where a normative expectation exists that the choice to be vaccinated should be respected. I assume that individuals (i.e., the vaccinated) are motivated to adhere to this norm but also have an incentive to prioritize their self-interest. Under this framework, individuals may strategically avoid acquiring information about another person’s vaccination status to justify prioritizing their own self-interest. I test this possibility of information avoidance through a financially incentivized experiment. Furthermore, utilizing an experimental design based on Exley and Kessler (2023), I examine whether this information avoidance is driven by self-image concerns.
Exley, C. L., & Kessler, J. B. (2023). Information avoidance and image concerns. The Economic Journal, 133(656), 3153-3168.
Intervention
The allocation game consists of two main conditions (Self/Other and Other/Other), and within each condition, there are three subconditions (Ingroup, Outgroup, and Uncertain).
1. Self/Other Condition
• The participant is always selected as the decision-maker.
• Player 1 is the participant (You), and Player 2 is Z.
• Player 1 (You) is always vaccinated, meaning you have received at least three doses of the COVID-19 vaccine and intend to receive vaccinations in future pandemics.
1.1. Ingroup Condition
• Player 2 (Z) is also vaccinated, meaning they have received at least three doses of the COVID-19 vaccine and intend to receive vaccinations in future pandemics.
1.2. Outgroup Condition
• Player 2 (Z) is unvaccinated, meaning they have never received any dose of the COVID-19 vaccine and do not intend to receive vaccinations in future pandemics.
1.3. Uncertain Condition
• Player 2 (Z) has a 50% probability of being vaccinated and a 50% probability of being unvaccinated.
• Before making the allocation decision, the participant is offered a cost-free opportunity to verify Player 2’s vaccination status.
• The participant may choose to utilize this opportunity or to ignore it.
2. Other/Other Condition
• The participant is always selected as the decision-maker.
• Player 1 is Y, and Player 2 is Z.
• Player 1 (Y) is always vaccinated.
2.1. Ingroup Condition
• Player 2 (Z) is also vaccinated.
2.2. Outgroup Condition
• Player 2 (Z) is unvaccinated.
2.3. Uncertain Condition
• Player 2 (Z) has a 50% probability of being vaccinated and a 50% probability of being unvaccinated.
• Before making the allocation decision, the participant is offered a cost-free opportunity to verify Player 2’s vaccination status.
• The participant may choose to utilize this opportunity or to ignore it.
Experimental design
In this study, participants take part in a financially incentivized allocation game. At the beginning of the experiment, the following rules are explained:
• Each participant (You) is grouped with two anonymous individuals, Y and Z, forming a three-person set.
• Y and Z are Japanese survey respondents registered with the same online survey company and reside in different regions across Japan.
• The base participation compensation for Y and Z is the same as that of the participant.
• None of the three individuals know each other, and they will not meet in person during the game.
• One individual is randomly selected as the decision-maker in each round.
• Based on the decision-maker’s choice, two of the three individuals (including the participant, Y, or Z) have the chance to receive an additional monetary reward as bonus points.
• The allocation game is conducted five times.
• After the experiment, one of the five rounds is randomly selected, and the additional compensation is distributed according to the decision made in that round.
The allocation game consists of two main conditions (Self/Other and Other/Other), and within each condition, there are three subconditions (Ingroup, Outgroup, and Uncertain).
1. Self/Other Condition
• The participant is always selected as the decision-maker.
• Player 1 is the participant (You), and Player 2 is Z.
• Player 1 (You) is always vaccinated, meaning you have received at least three doses of the COVID-19 vaccine and intend to receive vaccinations in future pandemics.
1.1. Ingroup Condition
• Player 2 (Z) is also vaccinated, meaning they have received at least three doses of the COVID-19 vaccine and intend to receive vaccinations in future pandemics.
1.2. Outgroup Condition
• Player 2 (Z) is unvaccinated, meaning they have never received any dose of the COVID-19 vaccine and do not intend to receive vaccinations in future pandemics.
1.3. Uncertain Condition
• Player 2 (Z) has a 50% probability of being vaccinated and a 50% probability of being unvaccinated.
• Before making the allocation decision, the participant is offered a cost-free opportunity to verify Player 2’s vaccination status.
• The participant may choose to utilize this opportunity or to ignore it.
2. Other/Other Condition
• The participant is always selected as the decision-maker.
• Player 1 is Y, and Player 2 is Z.
• Player 1 (Y) is always vaccinated.
2.1. Ingroup Condition
• Player 2 (Z) is also vaccinated.
2.2. Outgroup Condition
• Player 2 (Z) is unvaccinated.
2.3. Uncertain Condition
• Player 2 (Z) has a 50% probability of being vaccinated and a 50% probability of being unvaccinated.
• Before making the allocation decision, the participant is offered a cost-free opportunity to verify Player 2’s vaccination status.
• The participant may choose to utilize this opportunity or to ignore it.
Each participant plays five rounds of the allocation game, each under a different condition. As detailed in the experimental design, participants are randomly assigned to one of 20 condition sequences. This approach allows for both between-subject and within-subject analyses. For instance, by comparing differences in the first-round allocation decisions across individuals, it is possible to conduct between-condition comparisons across the six conditions.
Design details
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