Digital Prompts, Audits, and Penalties: The Spectrum of Tax Enforcement and Compliance

How to cite

Kotsadam, Andreas. 2025. "Digital Prompts, Audits, and Penalties: The Spectrum of Tax Enforcement and Compliance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015550. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15550-1.0

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Andreas Kotsadam*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015550
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15550-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-06-02 – 2028-02-20
Countries
Norway ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15550

Abstract

This pre-analysis plan presents a study that aims to measure the effects of real-time digital prompts, audits and penalty tax on tax compliance for taxpayers who have self-reported a reduction in wage income pre-filled by third parties. We set up a large-scale RCT for this target population, where we randomize (i) whether or not the taxpayer gets a prompting message when attempting to reduce their wage income in the digital tax return, (ii) whether or not the taxpayer is audited after the reduction, and finally (iii) whether or not the non-compliant taxpayer is punished with penalty tax. This experimental design allows us to identify the effects that each of these policy instruments have on tax compliance in the current or subsequent income year. The control groups for the audits and the penalty tax are treated later to ensure equal treatment so we are not investigating longer term effects. The focus of this plan is on the audit and tax penalty treatments and deviations from the plan will be highlighted in the future paper.

Intervention

Together with the Norwegian Tax Authorities we set up a large-scale RCT, where we randomize (i) whether or not the taxpayer gets a prompting message when attempting to reduce their wage income in the digital tax return, (ii) whether or not the taxpayer is audited after the reduction, and finally (iii) whether or not the non-compliant taxpayer is punished with penalty tax.

Experimental design

Together with the Norwegian Tax Authorities we set up a large-scale RCT, where we randomize (i) whether or not the taxpayer gets a prompting message when attempting to reduce their wage income in the digital tax return, (ii) whether or not the taxpayer is audited after the reduction, and finally (iii) whether or not the non-compliant taxpayer is punished with penalty tax. See the pre-plan document for details.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
1200 individuals
Observations
1200 individuals
Arms
600 individuals in control and 600 individuals in treatment.
Primary outcomes
Total liable income tax
Secondary outcomes
Claimed wage income, total taxes paid, and total taxable income

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords