The Effects of Input Heterogeneity and Rotational Water Allocation on Cooperative Behavior: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment

How to cite

Gugsa, Gebreegziabher Fentahun; Kahsay, Goytom Abraha; Belay, Dagim; Ayele, Zewdu Berhanie. 2025. "The Effects of Input Heterogeneity and Rotational Water Allocation on Cooperative Behavior: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015549. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15549-1.0

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Gebreegziabher Fentahun Gugsa* , Goytom Abraha Kahsay , Dagim Belay , Zewdu Berhanie Ayele

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015549
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15549-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-02-01 – 2025-04-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15549

Abstract

Managing shared water resources under climate change presents a critical challenge, as free-riding behavior often leads to resource depletion and inefficiencies in irrigation systems. Previous studies have explored cooperative behavior among irrigation users, often employing homogeneous endowment distributions. However, the effects of external interventions involving heterogeneous endowment provisions and rotational water allocation on these cooperative mechanisms remain overlooked. We employ a rotation system, in contrast to earlier research that mostly focused on quota or random water consumption assignment. This proposed study will investigates how labor heterogeneity and rotational water access influence cooperation, investment in watershed management, and equitable water distribution. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment, we will examine how different resource distribution mechanisms shape collective action. The experiment consists of two phases: a baseline phase (Rounds 1–2) and a treatment phase (Rounds 3–7). The baseline phase sets a benchmark for cooperative conduct under consistent circumstances by providing equal labor endowments to all participants and extracting water in a fixed order. Participants are divided into four groups at random during the treatment phase: three treatment groups and a control group. Equal labor endowments and fixed sequential water extraction are maintained in the control group. While maintaining a fixed sequential orders for water extraction, players are randomly assigned various labor endowments in Treatment 1 to create labor heterogeneity. While Treatment 2 maintains similar labor endowments, it introduces a water access system that rotates, with a new turn order each round. Both treatments are combined in Treatment 3.

Intervention

The experiment consists seven rounds, including two baseline rounds for practical familiarization (Rounds 1–2) and five treatment rounds (Rounds 3–7). At the beginning of the game, participants are assigned to one of four groups: a control group, a labor heterogeneity treatment group, a rotation treatment group, and a labor heterogeneity and rotation treatment group.

In the control group, participants receive equal labor endowments in every round, participant have uniform capacity to contribute to watershed management. Water allocation follows a fixed sequential order, meaning that players extract water in the same position each round without rotation. This setup serves as a benchmark for evaluating cooperative behavior and strategic decision-making in the absence of external interventions.

In the labor heterogeneity treatment, the fixed water position order remains unchanged, but labor endowments vary in random assignment (lottery) at the beginning of each round. Some players receive higher labor availability than others, representing real world variation in labor force capacity. This treatment examines whether unequal labor distribution affects collective action, investment in watershed management and irrigation canal maintenance, and decisions regarding water extraction when access to irrigation water remains constant.

In the rotation treatment, labor endowments remain uniform across all players, but water allocation follows a rotational system where the extraction order shifts each round. Over five rounds, each player experiences every possible position in the sequence once, ensuring no single player consistently holds an advantage or disadvantage in water access. This intervention assesses how changes in relative water access positions influence cooperation and long-term investment in shared resources.

In the combined treatment, participants experience both rotational water allocation and labor heterogeneity simultaneously. Each round, players are assigned different labor endowments, while the order of water extraction rotates to ensure that all players experience different levels of access over time.

Experimental design

This experiment is designed as a five player irrigation game to examine the influence of labor heterogeneity and rotational water allocation on cooperation, investment in watershed management, and water use fairness. Ten watershed user group members will be invited as participants and randomly assigned to two groups. Within each group, participants will be randomly assigned positions along a waterway, numbered 1 to 5, reflecting irrigation systems where irrigation users are assigned specific locations along a canal or waterway (1: upstream, 5: downstream). Players will engage in an irrigation game for seven rounds, where they make decisions on labor contributions for watershed management and water extraction. The first two rounds serve as a baseline phase, where all participants receive equal labor endowments, and water extraction follows a fixed sequential order. This stage familiarizes players with the game and establishes a reference point for cooperative behavior before introducing interventions.

The study involves 400 participants, who will be randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups. The first group will serve as the control group and will not receive any intervention.

1. Control Group: Participants continue under equal labor endowments, and position remains fixed in sequence. This serves as a baseline for evaluating changes in behavior under different treatments.
2. Labor Heterogeneity Treatment: Water extraction position remains fixed in sequence, but labor endowments vary across rounds, representing fluctuations and variability in workforce availability. This treatment assesses how disparities in labor resources affect collective action.
3. Rotation Treatment: Labor endowments remain equal, but water extraction follows a rotational system, where extraction positions change across rounds. This intervention examines whether rotating water access influences cooperation and investment.
4. Combined Treatment: Participants experience both labor heterogeneity and rotational water use, meaning that labor endowments differ across rounds while water access follows a rotating sequence.

Design details

Randomization method
We performed randomization through a public lottery
Randomization unit
Individual level
Clusters
No clusters
Observations
The total number of observations is 2800: 400 individuals, each playing 7 rounds
Arms
700 observations (100 individuals playing 7 rounds) for each experimental arm
Primary outcomes
Cooperation level (Amount of investment in watershed and irrigation management), Amount of Water Extraction and Water Access Equity (fairness in water distribution)
Secondary outcomes
Water Use Patterns and Labor Contribution Variability
Sponsors
Name: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Location: Denmark Url: https://um.dk/en
Partners
Name: University of Copenhagen Partner_type: government Url: https://www.ku.dk/en Name: Bahir Dar University Partner_type: government Url: https://www.bdu.edu.et/ Name: Policy Studies Institute Partner_type: government Url: https://psi.org.et/

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Keywords