Replication of “Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?”

How to cite

Jiang, Ming; Li, Jingchao; Huang, Yuting. 2025. "Replication of “Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?”." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015485. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15485-2.0

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Ming Jiang* , Jingchao Li , Yuting Huang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015485
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15485-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-03-10 – 2026-04-15
Countries
China (Shanghai), United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15485

Abstract

This study aims to replicate the key findings of Ederer and Manso (2013), an influential paper applying incentivized laboratory experiments to the study of entrepreneurship and innovation. Using the same experimental design involving a lemonade stand task, we will randomly assign subjects to three incentive conditions: fixed wage, standard pay-for-performance, and an "exploration" contract that tolerates early failure but rewards long-term success. We will test the original hypotheses that subjects under the exploration contract will engage in more exploratory behavior and be more likely to discover the optimal business strategy compared to the other conditions. We will measure exploration through subjects' location choices and variability in product decisions, as well as their final performance. The experiment will be conducted at Shanghai Jiao Tong University Smith Experimental Economics Research Center using the same program and instruction as the original study (with translation). Additional US sample will be collected at The Cleve E. Willis Experimental Economics Laboratory at UMass Amherst. By replicating this study with a new sample, we aim to assess the reliability and generalizability of the original findings on how compensation structures impact innovation. The results will have implications for designing incentive schemes to motivate exploration and innovation in organizational settings.

Intervention

incentives affect innovation and exploration behavior. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of five treatment conditions:

Fixed wage: Participants receive a fixed payment per period regardless of performance.

Pay-for-performance: Participants receive a percentage of the profits they generate throughout the entire experiment.

Exploration contract: Participants receive a percentage of the profits they generate only during the second half of the experiment.

Termination: Participants receive a percentage of profits generated in the second half of the experiment, but if their performance falls below a threshold in the first half, the experiment ends early.

Golden parachute: Same as termination, but participants receive a compensation payment if terminated early.

All participants will complete a task that involves operating a lemonade stand where they must make decisions about location, price, and product attributes. The task is designed to create a tension between exploiting a known strategy and exploring potentially better but initially unknown strategies.

Experimental design

The experiment design will follow exactly at the original study this study tries to replicate, other the instruction language (Chinese instead of English for the China study; the same for US study), experimental platform (oTree instead of zTree), and payment (standard hourly payment at Smith Experimental Economics Research Center at Shanghai Jiao Tong University).

Design details

Randomization method
randomization of treatment at session level, determined by computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
at least 379 individuals for China study at least 144 individuals for US study
Observations
at least 379 individuals for China study at least 144 individuals for US study
Arms
fixed wage: 51; pay-for-performance: 46; exploration: 47; termination: 71; golden parachute: 78 for China study; fixed wage: 51; pay-for-performance: 46; exploration: 47 for US study.
Primary outcomes
Innovation success: Measured by whether participants discover and choose the optimal business strategy (selling at the school location with appropriate product attributes) by the final period of the experiment. Exploration behavior: Measured by: Proportion of periods in which participants choose locations other than the default business district Subject-specific standard deviation of strategy choices for continuous variables (sugar content, lemon content, price) Time until subjects stop exploring (based on hazard rate models) Performance: Measured by: Maximum per-period profit achieved Final-period profit Average profit across all periods Effort: Measured by: Time spent on decision screens Completeness of participants' record-keeping in the provided decision tables Heterogeneous treatment effects: Examining how risk aversion moderates the effectiveness of different incentive schemes.

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Keywords