Replication of “Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?”
How to cite
Jiang, Ming; Li, Jingchao; Huang, Yuting. 2025. "Replication of “Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?”." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015485. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15485-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study aims to replicate the key findings of Ederer and Manso (2013), an influential paper applying incentivized laboratory experiments to the study of entrepreneurship and innovation. Using the same experimental design involving a lemonade stand task, we will randomly assign subjects to three incentive conditions: fixed wage, standard pay-for-performance, and an "exploration" contract that tolerates early failure but rewards long-term success. We will test the original hypotheses that subjects under the exploration contract will engage in more exploratory behavior and be more likely to discover the optimal business strategy compared to the other conditions. We will measure exploration through subjects' location choices and variability in product decisions, as well as their final performance. The experiment will be conducted at Shanghai Jiao Tong University Smith Experimental Economics Research Center using the same program and instruction as the original study (with translation). Additional US sample will be collected at The Cleve E. Willis Experimental Economics Laboratory at UMass Amherst. By replicating this study with a new sample, we aim to assess the reliability and generalizability of the original findings on how compensation structures impact innovation. The results will have implications for designing incentive schemes to motivate exploration and innovation in organizational settings.
Intervention
incentives affect innovation and exploration behavior. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of five treatment conditions:
Fixed wage: Participants receive a fixed payment per period regardless of performance.
Pay-for-performance: Participants receive a percentage of the profits they generate throughout the entire experiment.
Exploration contract: Participants receive a percentage of the profits they generate only during the second half of the experiment.
Termination: Participants receive a percentage of profits generated in the second half of the experiment, but if their performance falls below a threshold in the first half, the experiment ends early.
Golden parachute: Same as termination, but participants receive a compensation payment if terminated early.
All participants will complete a task that involves operating a lemonade stand where they must make decisions about location, price, and product attributes. The task is designed to create a tension between exploiting a known strategy and exploring potentially better but initially unknown strategies.
Experimental design
The experiment design will follow exactly at the original study this study tries to replicate, other the instruction language (Chinese instead of English for the China study; the same for US study), experimental platform (oTree instead of zTree), and payment (standard hourly payment at Smith Experimental Economics Research Center at Shanghai Jiao Tong University).
Design details
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