Social Dilemma with Endogenous Resources
How to cite
Liu, Siru; Jung, Eye Eoun; Lu, Wen; Mosier, Russell. 2025. "Social Dilemma with Endogenous Resources." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015483. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15483-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study investigates how the origin of shared resources in social dilemma games influences individual behavior. By distinguishing between endogenous resources, created through deliberate collective action, and exogenous resources, existing independently of participants’ choices, we explore how these origins impact decisions involving trust and reciprocity. We construct a novel two-stage public goods game to investigate the role of subjective expectations in shaping cooperative behavior. In this framework, social dilemmas involve strategic risks, as individuals weigh the potential benefits of mutual cooperation against the risks of exploitation or negative reciprocity. By incorporating belief elicitation, we examine how participants’ expectations about others’ actions influence their willingness to cooperate. Drawing on theories of risk, we analyze
the interplay between beliefs, trust, and reciprocity in decisions regarding public resources. Our findings reveal how the endogeneity of resource formation impacts behavior and beliefs about others’ actions, providing valuable insights for the management and policy development of public goods.
Intervention
The intervention in this experiment is the introduction of the two-stage treatment (Treatment PM), where:
Stage 1: Participants play a public goods provision game, contributing to a shared resource.
Stage 2: The same group plays a public goods mixed game for each possible established public account in Stage 1.
Experimental design
This study utilizes a novel two-stage treatment that combines a public goods provision game with a subsequent public goods mixed game played over the previously established public account (Treatment PM). We adopt a triadic design to clearly distinguish between decisions motivated by trust and reciprocity, which are conditional on the behavior of others, and decisions motivated by other-regarding preferences, which are unconditional. Behaviors observed in two one-stage controls, which are not influenced by conditional behaviors, will help differentiate between actions driven by trust and reciprocity and those driven by other-regarding preferences in the two-stage treatment. By combining the two-stage treatment with the triadic design, we can investigate whether the origin of a shared resource impacts the choice of further contribution or exploitation, an aspect that economists have not yet explored.
The between-subjects triadic design includes the novel two-stage treatment and two control treatments: subjects either participate solely in the provision game (Treatment P) or solely in the mixed game (Treatment M). In Treatment M, the funds in the public account are determined exogenously based on the provision stage of Treatment PM from a different session. Since Treatments P and M consist of only one stage, any differences in outcomes compared to Treatment PM will indicate behavior aligning with theories of reciprocity and trust. Participants in Treatment P cannot risk guaranteed earnings with the expectation of others cooperating in a second stage (trust), while participants in Treatment M cannot reciprocate others’ generous actions with generosity of their own (positive reciprocity).
Design details
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