Are Elites Meritocratic and Efficiency-Seeking? Evidence from MBA Students
How to cite
Reyes, Germán; Preuss, Marcel; Wu, Joy; Somerville, Jason. 2025. "Are Elites Meritocratic and Efficiency-Seeking? Evidence from MBA Students." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015448. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15448-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines how future business elites think about fairness and efficiency when making decisions that affect others' earnings. We conducted an experiment with MBA students from an elite university, asking them to redistribute earnings between workers whose pay was determined either by performance or by chance. We compare MBA students' choices to those of average Americans from previous studies. We find that MBA students implement more unequal distributions than average Americans, are highly responsive to both merit-based inequality and efficiency costs of redistribution, and hold distinct fairness views. Our findings offer insights into how future business leaders conceptualize fairness, which may help explain patterns of economic inequality and redistributive policies in the United States.
Intervention
Our intervention consists of experimentally manipulating two key factors that may influence redistributive decisions: (1) the process by which income inequality is generated between two hired workers, and (2) the efficiency costs of redistribution.
For the first intervention, we randomly vary whether the earnings of workers recruited through an online labor market are determined by performance or luck. In the "performance" treatment, the winner of each worker pair is determined based on their relative productivity in the encryption task. In the "luck" treatment, the winner is determined by a random coin flip, completely disconnecting earnings from effort or merit.
For the second intervention, we introduce an efficiency cost to redistribution. In the "efficiency cost" treatment, redistribution reduces the total income available (for every $1 taken from the winner, the loser receives only $0.50), creating a trade-off between equality and efficiency.
Experimental design
We conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment with MBA students to measure their fairness and efficiency preferences. The experiment followed the impartial spectator paradigm with three stages:
1. Production Stage: Workers recruited from an online labor platform completed an encryption task.
2. Earnings Stage: Workers were randomly paired, with winners receiving $6 and losers $0. We experimentally randomized how winners were determined through two mechanisms:
- "Performance" treatment: Winner determined based on relative task performance
- "Luck" treatment: Winner determined by random coin flip
3. Redistribution Stage: MBA students acting as impartial spectators chose how to redistribute earnings between worker pairs across three experimental conditions:
- Luck-based earnings with no redistribution cost
- Performance-based earnings with no redistribution cost
- Luck-based earnings with efficiency costs of redistribution (every $1 taken from the winner only increases the loser's earnings by $0.50)
Our design implements two levels of randomization: First, we randomly assign worker pairs to have their earnings determined by either performance or luck. This randomization allows us to causally identify how the source of inequality affects redistribution decisions. Second, each MBA student makes decisions for all three treatment conditions, with the presentation order randomized to mitigate sequence effects. This randomized controlled design enables us to causally estimate how both the source of inequality and efficiency costs impact the level of inequality implemented by future elites. The spectators could redistribute any amount from $0 to $6 in $0.50 increments, with their decisions determining workers' final payments.
Design details
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