Outcome Bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting 3
How to cite
Loewenfeld, Moritz. 2025. "Outcome Bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting 3." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015445. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15445-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
I consider a setting of delegated risk taking. Agents choose between a first-order stochastically dominant and a dominated lottery. Principals observe choices and outcomes of both lotteries and then decide whether to award a bonus payment to the agent. The goal of this experiment is to study whether outcome bias (OB), that is a tendency to condition bonus payments on outcomes, can shape the incentives faced by agents and thereby their choices. In particular, I seek to address the following research questions. 1) Can outcome bias in bonus decisions create incentives to choose suboptimal actions? 2) Do agents anticipate the OB of principals correctly and do they adjust their choices accordingly, i.e. can outcome bias induce more choices of sub-optimal actions and thus decrease welfare? I further seek to better understand the mechanisms driving outcome bias.
Intervention
I run an online experiment on prolific. For details on the design, see the document "design_pap.pdf".
Experimental design
Agents make a number of decisions between two lotteries on behalf of the principals. Principals decide on bonus payments. Participants are randomly and permanently assigned to the role of either principal or agent. There are two treatments, reward-before and reward-after. In the reward-before treatment, principals make bonus decisions conditional on the agents' choices. In the reward-after treatment, principals can also condition bonus payments on the realized outcomes.
In addition, there are two conditions. In the robustness condition, interactions are one-shot. In the consequences condition, agents are repeatedly matched to the same principal, which implies that principals can influence the agents choices with their bonus decisions.
Design details
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