Follow-up: Quality verification in markets with reputation: Theory and experiment
How to cite
Knutsen, Magnus Våge. 2025. "Follow-up: Quality verification in markets with reputation: Theory and experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015398. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15398-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
I investigate the interaction between two potential solutions to the moral hazard problem in markets for experience goods: quality verification and reputation building. I set up a dynamic quality choice model where short-lived buyers chose between a trusting and a distrusting action, and where a long-lived seller chooses between acting trustworthy or not. Through the presence of commitment behavioral types and the ability of buyers to observe the history of the seller, the seller can build and maintain a reputation. I extend this framework by letting buyers verify product quality at a cost. Contrary to what might be expected, the ability to verify product quality may hurt buyers. The reason is twofold. First, the ability to verify limits the ability of buyers to credibly commit to punishing distrusting behavior. Second, verification limits the ability of buyers to learn about the seller type from observation of previous actions. I implement a lab experiment to test the empirical content of the model.
This study is a follow up to Quality verification in markets with reputation: Theory and experiment (see https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4444384). The experiments I will run here are identical to those in the original study with one key difference: I will not induce commitment types in the lab.
Intervention
I set up repeated quality choice game where buyers can observe the seller's history. I exogenous vary the opportunity of buyers to verify quality at a cost before they chose whether or not to purchase.
Experimental design
I employ a between subjects design where I vary the ability of buyers to verify product quality.
Observational unit: average behavior in blocks of 5 subjects. Subjects are kept within blocks and unique subjects are used in all treatments.
Random matching of subjects within a block in each new game.
Design details
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