The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 1: Citizens
How to cite
Best, Michael; Abbas, Ali; Cheema, Ali; Khan, Adnan; Mohmand, Shandana. 2025. "The Political Economy of Progressive Tax Reform. Part 1: Citizens." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015393. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15393-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study aims to trace out the contours of politically feasible property tax reforms. Experiment 1 focuses on eliciting citizens' preferences for the level and progressivity of property taxes and their determinants through a series of vignettes.
Intervention
To understand the determinants of citizens' preferences over property taxes, we randomly assign survey respondents to receive combinations of 6 survey-experimental interventions.
1- In the Correcting Misperceptions treatment respondents are shown photographs of 5 properties that are representative of Lahore’s regressive schedule and we ask citizens to assess the tax liability associated with each property. We then provide respondents with the actual average tax rates faced by each of the properties and show them the actual shape of the tax schedule in Lahore.
2- The placebo intervention acts as a placebo for the interventions discussed below. This group receives an informational video message about the different tiers of government and the assignment of revenue and spending functions to each tier.
3- The Public Goods intervention provides respondents with information on local public good deficits in Lahore and argues that the lack of financing, which is a consequence of low property tax utilization is a big constraint on the government’s ability to meet the public service delivery needs of citizens
4- The Revenue Leakage intervention provides respondents with information on the magnitude of the property tax compliance challenge in Lahore and the potential financing that can become available if there was full compliance. It ends with the message that raising adequate financing for local public good provision in the city will be difficult for government in the absence of improved compliance
5- The Spending Leakage intervention provides respondents with information on citizen perceptions in Lahore about tax reciprocity, i.e. the proportion of taxes that are spent on the provision of public services in the city. It ends with the message that raising adequate financing for local public good provision in the city will be difficult for government in the absence of measures that can strengthen tax reciprocity
6- The Elite Capture intervention provides respondents with examples of recent cases where opposition from high value property owners in Lahore successfully delayed the introduction of reforms designed to raise more property taxes from the wealthy. It ends with the message that raising adequate financing for local public good provision in the city will be difficult for government in the absence of cooperation from the wealthy elite of the city.
Experimental design
We randomly assign survey respondents to one of six treatment arms. This is described in detail in our attached pre-analysis plan.
Design details
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