Pivotality in Consumption and Support for Regulation: Evidence from a Survey Experiment on Carbon Pricing
How to cite
Holzmann, Matthias. 2025. "Pivotality in Consumption and Support for Regulation: Evidence from a Survey Experiment on Carbon Pricing." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015369. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15369-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project aims to investigate the role of pivotality in shaping individuals' support for carbon pricing and consumption behavior in the presence of CO2 externalities. In a survey experiment, participants make incentivized purchasing decisions both with and without a carbon price, under two market conditions: In the control condition, individual consumption directly influences the aggregate market outcome, whereas the treatment condition reduces pivotality by introducing another consumer who could purchase the product instead. Afterwards, participants vote in groups of 25 on whether to implement a carbon price, considering different revenue redistribution schemes. We seek to explore how reduced individual responsibility for aggregate market outcomes affects voting behavior on carbon pricing, willingness to accept higher prices, and consumption choices. Additionally, we will investigate how pivotality influences social norms, including beliefs about others' consumption and the perceived social appropriateness of purchasing decisions.
Intervention
Participants take part in a survey experiment where they can purchase up to two virtual products that provide a payoff but also generate CO2 emissions, i.e. creating externalities. In the control condition, participants make independent purchasing decisions. In the treatment condition, their choices are interdependent with another participant, reducing the pivotality in aggregate emissions.
Experimental design
In the Control group, participants individually decide whether to purchase up to two products, each providing a payoff but causing CO2 emissions. In the Replacement Logic (RL) treatment, two participants share a market, making their purchasing choices interdependent. This reflects a between-subject design.
The next part follows a within-subject design. Participants make purchasing decisions both with and without a CO2 price and vote in groups on whether the price should be implemented. To do so, we randomly present them with three revenue recycling schemes for the carbon price: allocation to the state budget, redistribution, or funding of climate projects. Participants are randomly assigned to groups of 25 consumers and take part in a democratic vote to determine whether the CO2 price should be implemented. One of the three votes is randomly selected and implemented for payment.
Finally, we elicit social norms; both descriptive (beliefs about how others behave) and prescriptive (beliefs about what is socially appropriate).
Design details
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