Using Previous Health Behavior to Tailor Incentives

How to cite

Brown, Christina; Glennerster, Rachel; Haroon, Maryiam; Chandir, Subhash; Shah, Mubarak Taighoon; Siddiqi, Danya Arif. 2025. "Using Previous Health Behavior to Tailor Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015334. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15334-1.1

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Christina Brown* , Rachel Glennerster , Maryiam Haroon , Subhash Chandir , Mubarak Taighoon Shah , Danya Arif Siddiqi

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015334
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15334-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-10-02 – 2027-05-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15334

Abstract

Our study leverages an at-scale incentive for immunization program in Pakistan to understand whether it is possible to use prior behavior or self-selection, to identify who will benefit from commitment versus who will be harmed. If healthcare providers can tailor their incentives (allowing for a longer completion window, for certain individuals versus stricter deadlines for others), this could potentially have large benefits for timely vaccination. To test this, we have partnered with IRD, an NGO in Pakistan, to compare the effect of providing payments for immunization completion with or without a deadline, and, crucially, test whether we can isolate which types of individuals benefit or are harmed by deadlines. Households currently receive a payment of 275 PKR for each of six vaccination visits, the real value of which has eroded sharply with inflation. To understand the most cost-effective way to top up the existing payments, households will be randomly assigned to the status quo or one of three treatment conditions: parents will receive a payment of 500 PKR ($1.8 USD) each time their child receives an immunization: i). within a week of age-eligibility (short deadline) ii). within a month of age eligibility (long deadline) or iii). at any point before age 2 (no deadline).

Intervention

Households in Pakistan were randomly assigned to receive 500 PKR per vaccination under one of three conditions: (i) a short deadline—payment if the vaccine is received within one week of age eligibility, (ii) a long deadline—within one month of eligibility, or (iii) no deadline—anytime before age two.

Experimental design

The Expanded Program on Immunization by the government of Sindh introduced a 275 PKR mobile conditional cash transfer program with no deadline (under the age of 2) for six primary incentivised vaccines. Study participants were additionally randomized at the household level to one of four conditions:
-Control: Status quo
- Treatment group 1: Payment with no deadline, where caregivers receive 500 PKR when the child receives the vaccine.
- Treatment group 2: Payment with short deadline, where caregivers receive 500 PKR if the child receives the vaccine within one week of the eligible date set by the vaccinator.
- Treatment group 3: Payment with long deadline, where caregivers receive 500 PKR if the child receives the vaccine within one month of the eligible date set by the vaccinator.
The treatment is allocated at the household level, but the incentive is provided for each child for incentivized vaccines.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done on stata
Randomization unit
The treatment was assigned at the household level
Clusters
4,200 households
Observations
15,400 vaccination events
Arms
Control - 1,030 children Short Deadline - 1,165 children Long Deadline - 1,088 children No Deadline - 1,017 children
Primary outcomes
The main child-level immunization outcomes will be measured across a pooled regression for the six vaccines, focusing on: (i) whether the child received the vaccine by age 2; (ii) the number of days late after becoming age-eligible; (iii) the delay weighted by age-specific morbidity risk; and ( iv) timeliness, defined as receiving the vaccine within two months of eligibility. The primary outcome of interest will be (iii). This will aid in identifying whether the incentive improved timely vaccine receipt within the eligibility window or, conversely, if missing the initial deadline delayed vaccination further.
Secondary outcomes
The secondary outcomes of this study will investigate whether individuals attempted to receive the vaccine, as reported through survey responses, along with their reasons for not doing so. Additionally, the study will evaluate participants’ responses to treatment by assessing their adherence to one of three assigned vaccination deadlines—one week, one month, or by age two—as well as the timeliness of vaccination, measured by the number of days before or after their assigned deadline that they received the vaccine.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords