Tax Salience, Political Participation and Accountability -- Experiment in China
How to cite
Yu, Xiaohan. 2025. "Tax Salience, Political Participation and Accountability -- Experiment in China." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015252. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15252-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Public oversight of government actions is a critical factor in improving government efficiency and the quality of public services, thereby fostering development. Monitoring government fiscal revenues and expenditures constitutes a key aspect of such oversight. However, in some authoritarian regimes, the lack of transparency in taxation makes it particularly difficult to hold governments accountable for their fiscal activities.
One possible explanation for this opacity is that governments, whether intentionally or unintentionally, distort public perceptions of the actual amount of taxes they pay. This misperception of tax contributions can skew citizens' demands for the quantity and quality of public goods provided by the government, enabling the state to exert greater control over public opinion and reduce the likelihood of potential social resistance.
China exemplifies the phenomenon described above. Over the past few decades, amidst rapid economic growth and fiscal transformation, the Chinese government has extracted an increasing share of tax and non-tax revenues from society. However, contrary to existing theories that predict higher tax awareness leading to greater demands for representation under authoritarian regimes, this extraction has instead coincided with the strengthening of government control over society.
The underlying reason lies in the opaque manner of fiscal extraction by the Chinese government. This includes the imposition of less visible indirect taxes, disguising taxes under new labels that obscure their true nature, and leveraging media propaganda to frame taxation as a moral obligation. These institutional arrangements, coupled with propaganda effects, have led to significant distortions in citizens’ perceptions of taxation: they tend to underestimate their own tax burdens while overestimating the value of public goods provided by the government.
This raises a critical research question: How would revealing these distortions to the public affect their attitudes toward the government and their political participation under an authoritarian regime? We designed a randomized controlled trial involving over 2,000 Chinese citizens to explore this question.
Intervention
This study employs a two-dimensional, cross-randomized experimental design
embedded in an online survey.
Dimension 1: Tax Salience (Tax Calculator)
Participants are randomly assigned to one of three conditions:
Treatment Group 1 (Complete Calculator): Participants input their income, consumption, and asset information into an embedded tax calculator. The calculator returns a comprehensive estimate of their total tax burden, including value-added tax (VAT), consumption tax, fixed-asset-related taxes and fees (e.g., land transfer fees embedded in housing prices, deed tax, property tax), and social insurance contributions.
Treatment Group 2 (Incomplete Calculator): Participants use the same calculator interface and input the same information, but receive feedback covering only daily consumption taxes (VAT and consumption tax).Fixed-asset-related taxes are excluded.
Control Group: Participants complete the same income, consumption, and asset information inputs but receive no tax feedback.
Dimension 2: Political Efficacy Videos
Orthogonal to Dimension 1, participants are further randomly assigned to one of four conditions:
Video Treatment A (Internal Efficacy): A short video (~1 min) informing citizens of their legal rights to participate in public affairs and introducing concrete channels (e.g., mayor hotlines, 12345 government service platform, disciplinary inspection reporting, grassroots elections).
Video Treatment B (External Efficacy – Accountability): A short video showing clips from a televised government accountability program, in which officials are publicly questioned and held accountable by media and citizens.
Video Treatment C (External Efficacy – Outcome): A short video presenting a real case in which citizens collectively raised concerns about an unfinished housing project and the issue was ultimately resolved.
Control Group: No video shown.
The full design is a 3 (tax calculator) × 4 (video) factorial, yielding 12 experimental cells.
Experimental design
Dimension 1 – Tax Calculator (3 arms):
Arm 1 (Complete Calculator): Participants receive comprehensive tax burden feedback covering consumption taxes, fixed-asset-related taxes, and social insurance contributions.
Arm 2 (Incomplete Calculator): Participants receive partial tax burden feedback covering only consumption taxes (no fixed-asset taxes).
Arm 3 (Control): Participants provide the same financial information but receive no tax feedback.
Dimension 2 – Political Efficacy Video (4 arms):
Arm A (Internal Efficacy Video): Video about citizens' rights and available participation channels.
Arm B (Accountability Video): Video showing officials held publicly accountable.
Arm C (Outcome Video): Video showing a successful case of citizen action leading to policy change.
Arm D (Control): No video.
The two dimensions are independently and orthogonally randomized at the individual level, producing 12 (3 × 4) experimental cells.
Survey flow: (1) Pre-treatment measures (demographics, baseline tax perceptions, baseline political efficacy) → (2) Tax Calculator treatment → (3) Post-treatment measures for tax attitudes, government trust, public goods preferences, and political participation → (4) Video treatment → (5) Post-treatment measures for political efficacy and political participation.
Design details
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