Digital technology, meritocracy and rent-seeking, experiment in China
How to cite
Chen, Junkai; Bu, Lingtian; Miao, Meng. 2025. "Digital technology, meritocracy and rent-seeking, experiment in China." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015241. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15241-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The development of digital technology enables governments to collect vast amounts of data to enhance the quality of public services. Yet, concerns arise that such digital initiatives by governments might lead to increased power centralization and privacy infringement. In developing countries, such as China, local governments make significant investments in deploying digital technology, including the extensive installation of cameras for comprehensive street monitoring. This raises the question: What motivates government officials to actively support and implement these digital initiatives?
One explanation suggests leveraging digital technologies creates discreet rent-seeking opportunities. Top achievers in civil service examinations, ideally rewarded with higher pay according to traditionally held meritocratic principles, confront the stark reality of their modest salaries further diminishing due to government financial problems. This contrast, along with the potential efficiency gains from digital governance, makes rent-seeking justifiable.
We conduct a randomized experiment among 2,000 Chinese civil servants, applying two types of informational interventions—meritocracy and income. The meritocracy intervention inquires how many competitors they defeat in the civil service examination, whereas the income intervention asks if their recent salaries have been lowered. Civil servants then face a choice between fully automated and semi-automated devices for collecting data on enterprise fire safety. Compared with the fully automated device that autonomously uploads data to senior government levels, the semi-automated option requires manual intervention to decide on data uploads, creating rent-seeking opportunities.
Our findings indicate a preference for the semi-automated option under the income intervention, with a more pronounced pattern when combined with the meritocracy intervention. Our list experiment finds that these civil servants indeed understand that semi-automated systems offer more opportunities for rent-seeking, and they show greater tolerance for corruption after the intervention. We also dismiss alternative explanations such as technology idolization, distrust in technology, desires for power, and pro-social behaviors.
Experimental design
We conduct a randomized experiment among 2,000 Chinese civil servants, applying two types of informational interventions—meritocracy and income. The meritocracy intervention inquires how many competitors they defeat in the civil service examination, whereas the income intervention asks if their recent salaries have been lowered. Civil servants then face a choice between fully automated and semi-automated devices for collecting data on enterprise fire safety. Compared with the fully automated device that autonomously uploads data to senior government levels, the semi-automated option requires manual intervention to decide on data uploads, creating rent-seeking opportunities.
Design details
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