Do monetary incentives matter for identifying social preferences? [Registered Report]
How to cite
Henkel, Aljosha; Epper, Thomas; Fehr, Ernst; Senn, Julien. 2025. "Do monetary incentives matter for identifying social preferences? [Registered Report]." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015147. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15147-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This is the preregistration for the registered report entitled “Do monetary incentives matter for identifying social preferences.” Social preferences play an important role in a wide variety of domains. It is therefore important to measure them accurately. In this context, a particularly important question is whether monetary incentives matter for their identification. In this proposal, we provide the details of an experiment with a general population sample aimed at answering the following questions: i) Do incentives affect subjects’ willingness to pay to increase, and their willingness to pay to decrease the payoff of others? ii) Do incentives affect the distribution of social preferences? iii) Do incentives affect the precision of estimated parameters of a model of inequality aversion? We attach to this submission the (accepted) proposal of our registered report, which provides details on the proposed research design and outlines our plan for the data analysis.
Intervention
We measure social preferences using a money allocation tasks in which participants have to decide how to allocate experimental currency units (ECUs) between themselves and an anonymous other participant of the study. Our key treatment variation manipulates whether subjects’ decisions in the money allocation task are incentivized or not. In the HYPOTHETICAL treatment, we do not incentivize subjects’ choices, i.e., their decisions are hypothetical and do neither affects their own payoff, nor the payoff of the other participant. In contrast, we incentivize subjects’ decision in two treatments (LOW-INCENTIVES and HIGH-INCENTIVES) by paying them (and the recipients) on the basis of their choice in a randomly drawn choice situation. These treatments allow us to cleanly assess whether and how monetary incentives affect the measurement of social preferences. Moreover, the increase in stakes size between the LOW-INCENTIVES and the HIGH-INCENTIVES treatments, which are scaled by a factor of 5, allows us to assess whether stake size matters. See the attached registered report for details.
Experimental design
Our design is based on Fehr (r) al. (2022, 2023). We elicit social preferences using a task in which participants have to decide how to allocate experimental currency units (ECUs) between themselves and an anonymous other participant of the study. These choice situations systematically vary the cost and the efficiency consequences of redistribution. In addition to the money allocation task, the study will include questions related to subjects’ socio-demographics as well as a few additional survey items.
See the attached registered report for details.
Design details
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