Do monetary incentives matter for identifying social preferences? [Registered Report]

How to cite

Henkel, Aljosha; Epper, Thomas; Fehr, Ernst; Senn, Julien. 2025. "Do monetary incentives matter for identifying social preferences? [Registered Report]." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015147. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15147-1.1

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Aljosha Henkel* , Thomas Epper , Ernst Fehr , Julien Senn

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015147
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15147-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-01-10 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C80, C90, D30, D63
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15147

Abstract

This is the preregistration for the registered report entitled “Do monetary incentives matter for identifying social preferences.” Social preferences play an important role in a wide variety of domains. It is therefore important to measure them accurately. In this context, a particularly important question is whether monetary incentives matter for their identification. In this proposal, we provide the details of an experiment with a general population sample aimed at answering the following questions: i) Do incentives affect subjects’ willingness to pay to increase, and their willingness to pay to decrease the payoff of others? ii) Do incentives affect the distribution of social preferences? iii) Do incentives affect the precision of estimated parameters of a model of inequality aversion? We attach to this submission the (accepted) proposal of our registered report, which provides details on the proposed research design and outlines our plan for the data analysis.

Intervention

We measure social preferences using a money allocation tasks in which participants have to decide how to allocate experimental currency units (ECUs) between themselves and an anonymous other participant of the study. Our key treatment variation manipulates whether subjects’ decisions in the money allocation task are incentivized or not. In the HYPOTHETICAL treatment, we do not incentivize subjects’ choices, i.e., their decisions are hypothetical and do neither affects their own payoff, nor the payoff of the other participant. In contrast, we incentivize subjects’ decision in two treatments (LOW-INCENTIVES and HIGH-INCENTIVES) by paying them (and the recipients) on the basis of their choice in a randomly drawn choice situation. These treatments allow us to cleanly assess whether and how monetary incentives affect the measurement of social preferences. Moreover, the increase in stakes size between the LOW-INCENTIVES and the HIGH-INCENTIVES treatments, which are scaled by a factor of 5, allows us to assess whether stake size matters. See the attached registered report for details.

Experimental design

Our design is based on Fehr (r) al. (2022, 2023). We elicit social preferences using a task in which participants have to decide how to allocate experimental currency units (ECUs) between themselves and an anonymous other participant of the study. These choice situations systematically vary the cost and the efficiency consequences of redistribution. In addition to the money allocation task, the study will include questions related to subjects’ socio-demographics as well as a few additional survey items.

See the attached registered report for details.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is implemented directly on Qualtrics. Qualtrics randomly assigns subjects into either the HYPOTHETICAL treatment, the LOW-INCENTIVES treatment, or the HIGH-INCENTIVES treatment.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
-
Observations
3,000 subjects from a population sample that is broadly representative of the US population with respect to age and gender. Data collection will be completed in collaboration with Prolific. While our main analysis will rely on a general population sample, we will also collect responses from an additional 300 students carefully prescreened from Prolific. The study will include control questions for the money allocation task. Participants who fail to pass the control question will be excluded from the final sample. See the attached registered report for details.
Arms
3,000 general population subjects from Prolific: 1000 per treatment. 300 students from Prolific: 100 per treatment.
Primary outcomes
(1) Descriptive evidence: Subjects’ modal choice across negatively sloped budget lines and across positively sloped budget lines. (2) Clustering results: Distribution of subjects’ preference types resulting from the Dirichlet Process (DP) means clustering algorithm (Bayesian nonparametric approach). (3) Structural estimates: Distributions of structurally estimated parameters of aversion towards disadvantageous inequality (behindness aversion) and advantageous inequality (aheadness aversion). See the attached registered report for details.
Secondary outcomes
The end of the survey includes a module with additional survey questions that relate to subjects’ general preferences for redistribution, altruism, trust in government, political preferences, beliefs about causes of success in life, career choices, health behaviors with externalities, religiosity, and childhood experiences.

Cited by

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Keywords