Employment, Productivity, and Weak Institutions: Experimental Evidence from Nigeria

How to cite

Sonnenstuhl, Daniel J; Musa, Dauda. 2025. "Employment, Productivity, and Weak Institutions: Experimental Evidence from Nigeria." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015132. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15132-2.4

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Daniel J Sonnenstuhl* , Dauda Musa

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015132
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15132-2.4
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2025-01-20 – 2025-05-30
Countries
Nigeria (Lagos)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15132

Abstract

In many low-income countries, firms commonly do not pay their employees’ contractually owed salaries. Newspaper articles across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa frequently illustrate this issue for example. In this study, we investigate the consequences ensuing because employers often do not pay their employees contractual salaries. Employees often do not know if their salaries will be paid on time or if it will be paid at all if they enter into wage employment. We will investigate the issue of salary uncertainty in Nigeria, specifically the consequences for workers and job-seekers, with an experimental study. The experimental study contains two parts. The first part of the experiment is designed to analyze the effect of salary uncertainty on people’s willingness to for an employer (extensive margin). The second part of the experiment
analyzes the effect of salary uncertainty for employees. I.e. the effect of not receiving the salary payment on time while working.

Intervention

First, individuals receive a randomized job offer which varies the certainty of receiving salary payments on time or with a delay. Second, individuals who accept the job offer and whose job offers specify the possibility of a salary delay, randomly receive their salary payments on time or with a delay.

Experimental design

For this experiment, we create real employment opportunities
in Lagos, Nigeria and recruit employees for these jobs. The employment opportunities are offered through two cooper-
ating firms. The experimental design contains two stages of randomization. First,
individuals receive a randomized job offer. Second, people who accept the job offer
and whose job offers specified the possibility of a salary delay, randomly receive their
salary payments on time or with a delay.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization of the job offers is programmed into the survey software. Randomization of salary delay is done by the PI using a computer and a method specified in the pre-analysis plan.
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
300 employees and 400 additional jobseekers
Observations
300 employees and 400 additional jobseekers
Arms
30 employees in control arm 1, 270 employees in the main treatment arm 3.
Primary outcomes
Treatment effects of salary delay on productivity and absenteeism.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords