If you build it, will they come? Incentivizing the Adoption of Digital Financial Services in Niger
How to cite
Aker, Jenny; Awonon, Josué; Wirth, Olivia; Grimm, Michael; Petrik, Christina. 2025. "If you build it, will they come? Incentivizing the Adoption of Digital Financial Services in Niger." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015128. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15128-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Remittances and transfers are crucial for households in rural Niger, serving as tools for consumption smoothing and risk management in the absence of formal financial infrastructure. Mobile money, a non-bank digital payment platform, has the potential to lower transaction costs and
improve the speed, security, and reliability of transfers. Yet, despite strong demand for affordable money transfer mechanisms, mobile money adoption in Niger remains among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. We conduct a randomized controlled trial with 978 households across
61 villages, testing the impact of a simple financial incentive, paired with information and reminders, on mobile money adoption and use. We complement this with detailed data on agent networks to explore how local supply-side constraints impact adoption. We hypothesize that
incentivized adoption will lead to sustained usage, greater remittance inflows, and ultimately improve household resilience and welfare.
Intervention
As part of our baseline survey, we conducted an information experiment. The intervention involved a two-page flyer that explains mobile money, detailing how cash-in, cash-out, and transfer processes are executed. In addition to the flyer, treated respondents received a verbal explanation of mobile money and its services. To vary the treatment intensity, we randomly selected either 50% or 100% of respondents within a village to receive both the flyer and the verbal explanation.
To encourage the adoption and usage of mobile money, we implemented a financial incentive intervention. Households first received information about mobile money (as during the baseline survey), and were offered an incentive to use the service. The household was offered an incentive of 2,000 CFA (via mobile money), if they received a transfer via mobile money within one month from any person (i.e., a sender). The sender received a financial incentive of 1,000 CFA for making the mobile money transfer to the household. Transfer reception was verified through the network operator. The control group received no financial incentive.
We added reminder phone calls to test whether reminding households about the offer has an effect on their take-up of the financial incentive offer. We called half of the treated households to thank them for their participation in the last survey and to remind them that they only had two weeks left to receive a mobile money transfer from any person, in order to get the financial incentive. To test whether the continuous engagement with the households regarding our mobile money study had any effect, we also called half of the control households to thank them for their participation in the last survey and to remind them that we would be re-interviewing them shortly. Together, these three components allow us to assess both the independent and combined effects of addressing different barriers to mobile money adoption.
Experimental design
Sampling and data collection
Our study takes place in the Dosso region in Niger. Our sample of households is drawn from 61 villages located in nine communes in the departments of Dogon-Doutchi and Tibiri. The villages have been randomly chosen, but we had to avoid insecure villages while constituting the sample. The household baseline survey was conducted in February 2024 with 978 households. We recorded GIS locations of villages and households. We also implemented a phone survey in September 2024 interviewing the same households to assess the impact of a small randomized information treatment embedded in the baseline survey (see below for further details). The follow-up survey will take place in August 2025.
We also collect data on agents and agent networks to explore how local supply-side constraints impact adoption of mobile money. Our sample of agents was obtained through a listing of mobile money and airtime agents in 38 markets in the departments of Dogon-Doutchi and Tibiri. The markets were identified as the key markets associated with the villages from our household sample. The agent baseline survey was carried out in August 2024 and it was conducted with 190 agents from 36 markets. Out of the 190 agents, 92 are mobile money as well as airtime agents and 98 are only working as airtime agents. We will do an additional follow-up survey with the agents.
Randomization procedure
First, we randomly assigned the information treatment for the baseline survey. For this, we grouped communes into three regions: North, Middle, and South. Next, we created strata based on commune group and participation in a previous study on an adult literacy program. Villages were then randomly assigned to receive no information (1/3) or information (2/3). The villages that received information, the treatment intensity was either 50% or 100%. In the 50% treatment intensity villages, the random assignment of the information was stratified by respondents’ gender.
Second, we offered the financial incentive in the same 40 villages that received the baseline information treatment (pooling villages that received the 50% and 100% information treatments). The financial incentive was offered to all respondents in the 40 villages. We tested the treatment design in a pilot with a small urban sample beforehand. Taking the baseline information experiment into account, we have villages where all respondents received the information at baseline and during the intervention and the financial incentive (Full) and villages where only half of the respondents received the information at baseline, but then all respondents received the information during the intervention and the financial incentive (Half ).
Third, we randomly assigned households into the phone call component. This household-level randomization was stratified by village and espondents’ gender. Taking the reminder into account, we end up with these four groups: (1) a pure control group, (2) a control group that received a phone call, (3) a treatment group that received the information and the incentive, and (4) a treatment group that received the information, incentive and phone call reminder.
Spillovers
Treated households may share the information or the flyer that is handed out as part of the intervention with other households in the same village or other villages. Information sharing within the same village is not problematic for our identification, because we randomize the treatment at the village level. Since we will estimate intent-to-treat effects, information sharing across treated and control villages may only underestimate the effect of the information. However, we will monitor the extent of information sharing. Since from a policy perspective information sharing is a desired action which should increase the cost-effectiveness of the intervention, we will ask households whether they shared the information about mobile money with other households.
Given the personalized nature of our financial incentive and phone call and the in-person monitoring done by our implementing partner, we do not expect significant spillovers from our financial incentive treatment on control villages. The treatment and control villages are geographically dispersed, which minimizes the likelihood of interaction between treated and control units. These factors together suggest that any unintended influence of the treatment on control groups is likely to be small.
Design details
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