Peace in an unequal world

How to cite

Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Baier, Alexandra. 2025. "Peace in an unequal world." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015107. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15107-1.0

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Thomas Rittmannsberger* , Alexandra Baier

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015107
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15107-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-01-06 – 2025-02-28
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15107

Abstract

The proposed study investigates the emergence of (unarmed) peace and investments in arms in a guns-vs-butter conflict setting. We extend the conflict game by a novel feature, separating investment in arms from the decision to start a conflict, following the theoretical framework of Garfinkel & Syropoulos (2021). Based on this model we experimentally test the emergence of peace while varying the ability of players to reduce existing inequalities. Participants play a two-player guns-vs-butter conflict game, where one player (the advantaged) starts with more resources than the other player (the disadvantaged). In one experimental condition, they can transfer parts of their endowment before the conflict game (TRANSFER), while they cannot do so in the other (NoTRANSFER).

Intervention

Using a student sample, we experimentally investigate whether (unarmed) peace can be sustained if conflicting parties (players) can reduce existing resource inequalities, compared to a situation where they cannot.

We run two experimental conditions of a two-player winner-takes-all conflict (guns-vs-butter) game. In both conditions, a disadvantaged player starts with 80 Tokens, while an advantaged player starts with 120 Tokens. The conditions differ in the ability to transfer resources to another player. In one condition (UNEQUAL) they cannot transfer parts of their resources to the other player, while they can do so in the other (TRANSFER).

Our design allows us to experimentally investigate whether transfers are used to reduce existing inequalities and whether this leads to more peaceful outcomes.

Experimental design

The experiment will be conducted at the Lab of the Technical University of Munich (experimenTUM). Building on the model by Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2021), we employ an experiment with students in the role of conflicting parties who play the game for 7 rounds. Since we are interested in a one-period setting, we randomly re-match parties after each period, ensuring that the same pair of players will only meet once, therefore impeding reputation-building between players.

We will conduct two experimental conditions. We will run 4 (or five) sessions with 14 participants, grouped into one cluster, in every experimental condition. The conditions differ in the ability to transfer resources to another player. In one condition (UNEQUAL) they cannot transfer parts of their resources to the other player, while they can do so in the other (TRANSFER).

References:
Garfinkel, M. R. & Syropoulos, C. (2021). Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 148–178

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is carried out in the experiment by a computer software.
Randomization unit
Experimental Session
Clusters
4-5 clusters ́a 14 individuals in UNEQUAL 4-5 clusters ́a 14 individuals in TRANSFER
Observations
112 - 140 participants
Arms
56 (or 70) participants in UNEQUAL 56 (or 70) participants in TRANSFER
Primary outcomes
Decisions on whether to start a conflict and consequently the emergence of conflicts Investments in conflicts
Secondary outcomes
Belief about the decisions (starting conflicts, and investment in conflicts) of other player Amount transferred to other players (only in TRANSFER)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords