Livestock financing through micro-equity
How to cite
Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab; Ambler, Kate; Brauw, Alan de; Uddin, Mohammad Riad. 2024. "Livestock financing through micro-equity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015104. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15104-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study presents a randomized controlled trial that tests an asset-based micro-equity livestock financing model in northern Bangladesh. The approach uses a profit-sharing mechanism to purchase and fatten cows, distributing risks and rewards between the financier and smallholder farmers. Another treatment arm offers a standard loan with a fixed repayment structure. We randomly assign 105 villages into control, profit-sharing, and loan-based groups, along with a within-household randomization of whether the offer is made to the husband or wife. The baseline covers 1,517 households, followed by phone midline and in-person endline surveys to track livestock ownership, time allocation, household consumption, borrowing, and women’s empowerment. We propose to employ an ANCOVA framework with strata fixed effects, estimating the Intent-to-Treat Effects, and adjust for multiple comparisons across outcome families. By comparing profit-sharing to the standard loan product, this trial aims to determine whether risk-sharing contracts can enhance household well-being and women’s decision-making relative to traditional debt-based financing.
Intervention
We implemented two treatments targeting smallholder farmers interested in cattle fattening. First, in the “profit-sharing” arm, a partner organization purchased young cattle on behalf of eligible households, who then fattened and sold them collaboratively; the net proceeds were shared between the partner and the household. Second, in the “standard loan” arm, households received a fixed-repayment loan to purchase cattle. Both treatments featured within-household randomization, whereby either the husband or the wife was the designated contract holder.
Experimental design
We are randomly assigning 105 villages into three groups: (i) Control, which receives no offer of livestock financing; (ii) Treatment 1, which is offered a profit-sharing contract; and (iii) Treatment 2, which is offered a standard loan contract with fixed repayment. Within each treatment village, households who meet eligibility criteria are further randomized at the household level so that either the husband or the wife is designated as the contract holder. Baseline data collection was followed by a phone-based midline and an in-person endline.
Design details
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