Social Preferences in Resource-Sharing Environments
How to cite
Michel, Grace; Abdillahi, Umulkher Ali. 2024. "Social Preferences in Resource-Sharing Environments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015103. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15103-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This research explores the relationships between inequality, envy, and productivity in resource-sharing contexts. Building on behavioral economics and social psychology, this study investigates how inequality affects jealousy and subsequently influences individuals’ economic behaviors, particularly effort and redistribution. The project will be situated in rural Kenya, where collectivist norms and informal redistribution mechanisms shape economic decisions. Using randomized control trials, we aim to identify the causal links between inequality and envy, the role of jealousy in sanctioning behaviors, and how visibility impacts effort choices. Two experimental designs are employed: the first examines social responses to inequality and the second evaluates effort disincentives in a workplace setting under varying types of conspicuousness. This study will contribute to understanding the socioeconomic dynamics of inequality and provide insights into policy interventions aimed at enhancing productivity and fostering equitable growth.
Experimental design
Experiment 1:
Workers will be grouped into pairs. The pairs will be randomized into one of four treatment groups, following a 2x2 randomization design. The first dimension of randomization is inequality. Half of the pairs will have equal wages, while half will have worker 1 earning more than worker 2 through a bonus. The second dimension is resource sharing. When forming the pairs, half of the pairs will include two individuals who already engage in resource sharing, while the other half will have pairs in different resource-sharing networks.
Experiment 2:
The experiment will be divided into six time periods based on the workers' payment schedules. For the first three periods of the study, workers in payment groups will be paid privately to avoid any precise signal of effort. In periods 4 through 6, groups of three workers will be randomized into payment groups, varying (1) whether earnings are public and (2) the highlighting of top workers. For (2), there will be four different types of highlighting from no highlighting to highlighting with verbal recognition and a monetary bonus.
Design details
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