The Social Welfare Functions of Elected Politicians - Follow-up Survey and Experiment

How to cite

Doerrenberg, Philipp; Ambuehl, Sandro; Blesse, Sebastian; Feldhaus, Christoph; Ockenfels, Axel. 2024. "The Social Welfare Functions of Elected Politicians - Follow-up Survey and Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015070. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15070-1.0

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Philipp Doerrenberg* , Sandro Ambuehl , Sebastian Blesse , Christoph Feldhaus , Axel Ockenfels

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015070
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15070-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-12-20 – 2025-01-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15070

Abstract

We conduct a follow-up survey to a study that is published as a working paper and that was also pre-registered. The initial working paper version and pre-registration are available as CESifo Working Paper No. 10329 (https://www.cesifo.org/en/publications/2023/working-paper/politicians-social-welfare-criteria-experiment-german-legislators-0) and AEARCTR-0007689 (https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7689). The Abstract of the initial working paper describes the content of this follow up study and reads as follows:

Much economic analysis derives policy recommendations based on social welfare criteria intended to model the preferences of a policy maker. Yet, little is known about policy maker’s normative views in a way amenable to this use. In a behavioral experiment, we elicit German legislators’ social welfare criteria unconfounded by political economy constraints. When resolving preference conflicts across individuals, politicians place substantially more importance on least-favored than on most-favored alternatives, contrasting with both common aggregation mechanisms and the equal weighting inherent in utilitarianism and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. When resolving preference conflicts within individuals, we find no support for the commonly used “long-run criterion” which insists that choices merit intervention only if the lure of immediacy may bias intertemporal choice. Politicians’ and the public’s social welfare criteria largely coincide.

Experimental design

We study preference-aggregation and paternalistic-intervention decisions in a sample of "normal"/lay people.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
1000
Observations
1000
Arms
500/500 for the randomized ordering of the two survey parts 333/333/333 for the randomized ordering of displayed charities within the aggregation survey part.
Primary outcomes
Same as in the original working paper version: -- Aggregation decisions -- Choice Set Restrictions (i.e., Paternalistic interventions)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords