Large Firms and the Intensive Margin of Labor Informality Evidence from an Enforcement Intervention in Peru

How to cite

Cruces, Guillermo; Bosch, Mariano. 2024. "Large Firms and the Intensive Margin of Labor Informality Evidence from an Enforcement Intervention in Peru." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0015026. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15026-1.0

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Guillermo Cruces* , Mariano Bosch

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0015026
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15026-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-10-01 – 2018-12-31
Countries
Peru ()
JEL codes
C93, D91, H55, J46, O17
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/15026

Abstract

In developing countries, informal labor is not only employed by illegal or unregistered firms but also by legal firms that hire workers informally, known as the intensive margin of labor informality. Reducing this type of work may have ambiguous effects on formal employment, depending on factors such as firm size and productivity. In collaboration with Peru’s labor inspection authority, we conducted a randomized mailing experiment targeting large firms with a high propensity for employing workers informally. The authority sent letters with either deterrence messages detailing fines for non-compliance or social norms messages highlighting the positive impacts of formality. We analyzed the impact of this intervention on formal employment levels over the following two years using monthly administrative data. The treated firms, particularly those in the deterrence treatment arm and larger firms, increased their formal employment levels. However, these increases followed a seasonal pattern coinciding with the high labor demand during the touristic season, suggesting that prior to the intervention, firms were employing temporary workers informally. The higher perceived cost of non-compliance led them to formalize some of these workers. The informal hiring of seasonal workers by these firms appears to have been motivated by basic tax evasion, and the absence of a negative effect on firm-level employment indicates that the firms were exploiting rents from low enforcement of regulations.

Intervention

In collaboration with Peru’s labor inspection authority, we conducted a randomized mailing experiment targeting large firms with a high propensity for employing workers informally. The authority sent letters with either deterrence messages detailing fines for non-compliance or social norms messages highlighting the positive impacts of formality.

Experimental design

In collaboration with Peru’s labor inspection authority, we conducted a randomized mailing experiment targeting large firms with a high propensity for employing workers informally. The authority sent letters with either deterrence messages detailing fines for non-compliance or social norms messages highlighting the positive impacts of formality. We analyzed the impact of this intervention on formal employment levels over the following two years using monthly administrative data.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
The randomization unit is firms with 50 or more employees deemed high risk by the authorities.
Clusters
1045 firms
Observations
1033
Arms
348 in deterrence letter, 349 in social norms letter, 348 no letter
Primary outcomes
Firms formal employment levels

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords