Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability in Bangladesh?
How to cite
Mobarak, Ahmed; Guiteras, Raymond. 2016. "Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability in Bangladesh?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001502. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1502-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study political economy responses to a large scale intervention in Bangladesh, where
four sub-districts consisting of 100 villages (12,000 households) were randomly assigned
to control, information or subsidy treatments to encourage investments in improved
sanitation. In theory, leaders may endogenously respond to large interventions by
changing their allocation of effort, and their constituents’ views about the leader may
rationally change as a result. In one intervention where the leaders’ role in program
allocation was not clear to constituents, constituents appear to attribute credit to their
local leader for a randomly assigned program. However, when subsidy assignment
is clearly and transparently random, the lottery winners do not attribute any extra
credit to the politician relative to lottery losers. The theory can rationalize these
observations if we model leaders’ actions and constituent reactions under imperfect
information about leader ability. A third intervention returns to program villages to
inform a subset of subsidy recipients that the program was run by NGOs using external
funds. This eliminates the excess credit that leaders received from treated households
after the first intervention. These results suggest that while politicians may try to take
credit for development programs, it is not easy for them do so. Political accountability
is not easily undermined by development aid.
Experimental design
An implicit assumption in the argument that aid undermines political accountability is that constituents are systematically and consistently fooled: that they mistakenly believe that their local leaders are responsible for the aid program, and give them undeserved credit. This project tested this assumption in the context of a large-scale randomized intervention in rural Bangladesh using two sanitation interventions and two information treatments.
The sanitation intervention consisted of two main components. The first component, called the Latrine Promotion Program, consisted of a multi-day community exercise designed to raise awareness of the problems caused by open defecation and non-hygienic latrines. For the second component, eligible households received sanitation subsidies which covered part of the cost of building a hygienic latrine.
For the information treatments, households were informed about the source of the sanitation intervention. One group of households were treated using the "implicit" script, which informed them that the intervention had been part of a research project, but did not explicitly say anything about the role of local leaders. A second group of households were treated using the "explicit" script, which explicitly stated that villages had received benefits on the basis of a lottery and that the government had not played any role in funding the intervention nor in selecting villages.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Guiteras, Raymond, and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak. “Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention.” Working Paper, March 2014. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/875%20Development%20aid%20and%20political%20accountability%20Mar2014.pdf
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