Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL) program evaluation

How to cite

Romero, Mauricio; Sandefur, Justin; Sandholtz, Wayne. 2016. "Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL) program evaluation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001501. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1501-6.3999999999999995

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Mauricio Romero* , Justin Sandefur , Wayne Sandholtz

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001501
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1501-6.3999999999999995
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-09-05 – 2019-12-31
Countries
Liberia (Lofa, Nimba, Bomi, Bong, Grand Bassa, Grand Cape Mount, Margibi, Montserrado, River Cess, Sinoe, Grand Kru, Maryland, and Gbarpolu)
JEL codes
H52, I25, I28, C93
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1501

Abstract

We propose a large-scale field experiment to study the effect of a public-private partnership (PPP) in Liberia. The Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL) program will delegate management of 92 randomly assigned public schools to be operated free of charge to students by a variety of private organizations, both for-profit and non-profit. By comparing these PSL schools to regular government schools in the control group, we will test whether private management improves school management and teacher accountability as measured by absenteeism, time on task, and ultimately student performance. Complementary analysis will assess the sustainability, scalability, and relative cost-effectiveness of this PPP model, as well as its effects on equity through student composition and spillovers.

Intervention

THE PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS FOR LIBERIA (PSL) PROGRAM

PSL is a contract-management public-private partnership (PPP). Specifically, the Liberian Ministry of Education (MoE) contracted multiple non-state operators to run existing public primary schools (PSL schools). Philanthropic donors provide these operators with funding on a per-pupil level. In exchange, operators are responsible for the daily management of the schools, and can be held accountable for results.
PSL schools will continue to be free and non-selective public schools (i.e., operators are not allowed to charge fees or choose which students to enroll). PSL school buildings will remain under the ownership of the government. Teachers in PSL schools will be existing government teachers (i.e., public servants). Private providers will be accountable to the government for performance. Specifically, operators must agree to school inspections and provide the necessary data to evaluate performance. However, formal mechanisms holding operators accountable for student performance are not yet finalized.

An important feature of PSL schools, compared to traditional charter schools, is that teachers in these schools will be civil servants. This hampers the operators’ ability to hold teachers accountable for learning outcomes and raises the question of whether this type of “soft” accountability will affect teachers' behavior.

Experimental design

There are eight partners in charge of implementing the program’s pilot, all chosen by the government. In the first pilot year (2016/2017), BRAC is managing 20 schools, Bridge International Academies 22, the Liberia Youth Network 4, More than Me 6, Omega Academies 19, Rising Academies 5, Stella Maris 4, and Street Child 12.

Based on criteria established by the evaluation team, MoE, and operators, 185 PSL-eligible schools were identified. 92 schools across 12 counties were randomly selected for treatment. Each treated school will be administered by one of the eight private operators. Since each operator has different criteria for the schools they are able to administer, each school submitted a set of criteria necessary for their schools. Based on these criteria, the universe of 185 experimental schools was split into 8 mutually exclusive groups corresponding to the 8 operators, with each operator’s group containing twice the number of schools that operator will manage. Within each of these groups, half of the schools were randomly chosen to be treated, with the rest serving as controls.

Since the composition of students may change across PSL and control schools in response to treatment assignment, we will sample students from 2015/2016 enrollment logs, which was created prior to community awareness about PSL intervention. Each student will be evaluated as part of her/his “original” school, regardless of what school (if any) s/he attended in subsequent years. Using this panel dataset, we can recover the effect of PSL schools under an Intention-to-Treat (ITT) framework. Under some assumptions, we can use instrumental variables to recover the Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT)

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office using Stata
Randomization unit
Treatment happens at the school level; it consists of a private operator taking responsibility for the administration of a government school.
Clusters
185 Schools
Observations
20 students per schools, therefore a total of 3,700 students ~8 teachers per school, therefore a total of 1,480 10 households per school, therefore a total of 1,850
Arms
There are 92 treatment schools, and 93 control schools
Primary outcomes
Access to schooling (i.e., enrollment rates in communities with and without PSL schools) Learning outcomes of students Teacher behavior (e.g., absenteeism, time on task, use of corporal punishment, and teachers' job satisfaction and turnover rates) School management (e.g, monitoring visits, support and training for teachers, investment in school infrastructure and materials, and extra-curricular activities) Parental engagement in education (e.g., expenditure on education and involvement in school activities) Equity, as measured by the socio-economic composition of students who access PSL schools Equity, as measured by spillover effects on nearby non-PSL schools
Sponsors
Name: Aestus Foundation Location: Australia Name: The UBS Optimus Foundation Location: Zürich, Switzerland Url: https://www.ubs.com/microsites/optimus-foundation/en/home.html Name: ESRC Location: England Url: https://esrc.ukri.org/
Partners
Name: Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) Partner_type: ngo Url: https://www.poverty-action.org/

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Romero, Mauricio, Justin Sandefur, and Wayne Aaron Sandholtz. 2020. "Outsourcing Education: Experimental Evidence from Liberia." American Economic Review, 110 (2): 364-400. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20181478&&from=f
  2. Romero, Mauricio, Justin Sandefur, and Wayne Aaron Sandholtz. 2020. "Outsourcing Education: Experimental Evidence from Liberia." American Economic Review, 110 (2): 364-400. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20181478&&from=f

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Keywords