Unintended discrimination in financial advice

How to cite

Eyting, Markus; Hett, Florian; Laudenbach, Christine. 2025. "Unintended discrimination in financial advice." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014980. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14980-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Markus Eyting* , Florian Hett , Christine Laudenbach

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014980
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14980-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-04-17 – 2025-05-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14980

Abstract

Wealth inequality across social groups is a pressing concern in modern society (Chancel et al. 2022). Factors like labor market participation or systematic wage gaps are typically considered as key explanatory factors. However, even with initially equalized income and wealth distributions, systematic socioeconomic disparities may emerge due to variations in investment returns and even accumulate over time.
As investment decisions are complex, as they should ideally fit individual circumstances and preferences, many households require expert guidance and advice, which mostly takes place via actual social interaction – human advisors assess the situation of the individual advisee and make their investment recommendations accordingly. This interpersonal nature introduces scope for biases in judgment and decision making, that might negatively affect the quality of particular financial advice. Depending on the nature of these biases, they might differentially affect the advice to specific social groups, hence giving rise to differences in expected returns and ultimately amplifying systematic differences in financial wellness.

This research project investigates the influence of (mis)perceptions and stereotypes in the process of investment advice to better understand the underlying mechanisms driving differences in wealth accumulation. Existing work has looked at discrimination in financial advice with respect to general quality, i.e., whether specific groups have the same access to financial products, receive the same product at higher prices or inferior products at similar prices (e.g., Alesina et al. 2013, Brock and De Haas 2020, Bucher-Koenen et al. 2023, Bhattacharya et al., 2023). In this project, we take another perspective and consider differences in the match quality as the relevant outcome: If financial advice is to a substantial part about finding the right products given the specific preferences of an individual, professionals’ advice may effectively discriminate against specific groups, if the advice is based on inaccurate perceptions of these preferences. If this inaccuracy differs systematically between specific social groups, this mechanism can induce unintended discrimination: Even though professionals give advice “to the best of their knowledge”, differences in this knowledge lead to differential treatment of different groups.

We analyze the existence and accuracy of stereotypes regarding investor preferences of men and women. We ask whether these stereotypes systematically vary in their accuracy, i.e., whether men and women are equally understood in terms of their investment preferences. We also investigate whether professional advisers are particularly prone or resistant to (wrong) stereotyping.

Intervention

In stage 1, we recruit a representative sample of the German population who represent clients seeking financial advice. We elicit two different kinds of information on their risk preferences, as well as various demographic information, such as gender, age, or the clients’ race, as well as open text field information about the clients' looks and hobbies.

In stage 2, we recruit (i) a second representative sample of the German population acting as financial advisors and (ii) a German sample of actual financial advisors. All participants are presented with a sequence of client profiles from stage 1 and asked for their portfolio recommendation for the particular client and how confident they feel about this advice.

In stage 2 we vary the incentive and information structures of the advisors.

Experimental design

We run a two staged online experiment.

In stage 1, we recruit a representative sample of the German population who represent clients seeking financial advice. We elicit two different kinds of information on their risk preferences, as well as various demographic information, such as gender, age, or the clients’ race, as well as open text field information about the clients' looks and hobbies.

In stage 2, we recruit a German sample of financial advisors. All participants are presented with a sequence of client profiles from stage 1 and asked for (i) their portfolio recommendation for the particular client and (ii) how confident they feel about this advice.

In stage 2 we vary the incentive and information structures of the advisors.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization by a computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
clients: 200 laymen sample of advisors: 2000 expert sample of advisors: 400
Observations
Given that each advisor gives ten portfolio recommendations, we plan with 2000*10 = 20.000 portfolio recommendations of laymen advisors. Given that each advisor gives ten portfolio recommendations, we plan with 400*10 = 4000 portfolio recommendations of expert advisors. We plan to elicit 500 risk preferences from clients (one each).
Arms
laymen sample of advisors: 400 per treatment arm expert sample of advisors: 130 per treatment arm
Primary outcomes
- Portfolio recommendation of advisors - Client risk preferences as measured by the interactive risk simulation tool
Secondary outcomes
- Risk elicitation using standard survey - Groupiness measure - Age, Gender, nationality, education, profession, political party, religion - Decision times - Attention Checks

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords