We propose an experiment to examine how investor characteristics influence access to corporate insiders in U.S. public companies. Despite the well-documented benefits of insider access for investors, the mechanisms governing this access remain unclear. This opacity perpetuates information asymmetries and raises concerns about the fairness and inclusivity of capital markets. Our study will address this gap by providing causal evidence on both the likelihood of securing access and the quality of access granted. Our findings will provide evidence on the potential role discrimination plays in financial markets.
Experimental design
We will conduct an email-based field experiment.
Design details
Randomization method
We will randomly assign companies in our sample to one of eight experimental conditions, subject to balance on market value of equity, personal vs generic IR email contact address, and retail ownership percentage, using the ‘randtreat’ Stata package.
Randomization unit
Firm
Clusters
2,750 firms
Observations
2,750 firms
Arms
Approx. 345 firms per treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
We will create a binary indicator variable, Meeting, equal to one if the company agrees to schedule a call, and zero otherwise.
Secondary outcomes
As a secondary outcome measure, we will assess a company’s responsiveness by classifying interactions into four groups: (1) the company responds and is willing to schedule a call, (2) the company responds and is unwilling to schedule a call but is willing to answer questions via email, (3) the company responds but is not willing to talk nor makes an effort to answer questions via email, and (4) the company does not respond. Companies will be classified as non-responsive if they fail to reply within 14 days of the initial email and subsequent follow-up procedures outlined in Section 3. Based on these groupings, we will create an ordered variable, Responsiveness, taking the values 3, 2, 1, and 0 for companies classified in groups (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively.
To quantify the timeliness and quality of information provision, we will create additional outcome variables. Speed of Response will measure the number of hours between our initial email and the first substantive IR response (i.e., excluding auto-replies), capturing how quickly investors receive attention from a real individual. For companies willing to schedule a call, we will create Speed of Meeting, measuring the number of business hours between our initial email and the earliest proposed call time. To provide evidence on the quality of information provision, we will measure Seniority, a ranked variable based on the job titles of individuals offered for calls, with the assumption that more senior representatives possess higher quality company information. We will hand-collect these job titles and create a ranking based on our sample.
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