Cash Transfers, Lotteries, and Group Incentives: Experimental Evidence on Reducing Crop Residue Burning in Thailand

How to cite

Viriyavipart, Ajalavat; Attavanich, Witsanu; Lopes, Adrian; Tiwari, Sailesh. 2024. "Cash Transfers, Lotteries, and Group Incentives: Experimental Evidence on Reducing Crop Residue Burning in Thailand." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014933. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14933-1.0

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Ajalavat Viriyavipart* , Witsanu Attavanich , Adrian Lopes , Sailesh Tiwari

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014933
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14933-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-12-21 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Thailand ()
JEL codes
C93, Q53, Q57, D90
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14933

Abstract

This study investigates the effectiveness of different financial incentives to reduce crop residue burning (CRB) among farmers in Thailand. Using a field experiment, we evaluate three treatment groups and a control group. The control group receives no intervention, serving as a baseline to observe CRB practices. In the treatment groups, farmers are rewarded for adopting alternative methods to manage crop residue. In T1, farmers receive a guaranteed cash payment for avoiding CRB. In T2, farmers who avoid CRB receive a lottery with an equal probability of receiving a payment either lower or higher than the guaranteed amount in T1. In T3, farmers are placed in anonymous groups of four, with cash transfers contingent on at least two group members refraining from CRB. This design enables us to compare the efficacy of fixed payments, probabilistic rewards, and group-based incentives in promoting sustainable agricultural practices.

Experimental design

There are three treatments and one control group:

Control group: No interventions. This group serves as a baseline to measure the impact of the treatments.

T1: Standard conditional cash transfer: Farmers receive a cash transfer of 200 THB/rai if they comply with the condition of not burning their crop residue after harvesting.

T2: Lottery transfer: Farmers will receive a lottery conditional on not burning their crop residue after harvesting. The lottery has a 50-50 chance of awarding either 100 THB/rai (50% of T1) or 300 THB/rai (150% of T1).

T3: Group-based conditional cash transfer: Farmers are randomly assigned to an anonymous group of four (group members remain unknown to each other). Farmers will receive a cash transfer conditional on at least two farmers in the groups complying with the condition of not burning. If two farmers in the group comply, each farmer receives a cash transfer of 100 THB/rai (50% of T1). If three farmers in the group comply, each farmer receives a cash transfer of 150 THB/rai (75% of T1). If all four farmers in the group comply, each farmer receives the full amount (200 THB/rai). If 0 or 1 farmer complies, no farmer receives a transfer.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization in the office by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
-
Observations
400 farmers
Arms
100 farmers for each arm
Primary outcomes
whether farmers burn their crop residue after harvesting

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords