Are There Individual Differences in the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Sabotage and Competition?

How to cite

Teh, Adelson. 2024. "Are There Individual Differences in the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Sabotage and Competition?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014841. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14841-1.0

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Adelson Teh*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014841
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14841-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-11-25 – 2025-05-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D90, J00, M52
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14841

Abstract

The main goal of this study is to understand whether individuals might prefer to avoid situations where they have to engage in sabotage, both as a saboteur and as a possible victim of sabotage. Specifically, this study looks at whether individuals might be willing to give up some expected payment to avoid engaging with sabotage and whether this willingness might differ across individual demographics (gender) and characteristics (altruism). This study will also look at whether the willingness to sabotage, and preferences for competition (with or without sabotage) differ across these same characteristics (i.e., gender and altruism) in its ancillary analysis.

Intervention

The main idea of the experiment revolves around participants being asked to choose between different compensation schemes under which they would most prefer to complete a job under. By varying whether these schemes allow for sabotage and their expected compensation, observing the choices of the participants between these schemes will allow us to get at their willingness to pay (i.e., how much expected compensation they are willing to give up) to avoid sabotage. The schemes will also vary in whether they are competitive or non-competitive in nature.

Experimental design

Participants will need to complete 3 rounds of a job, with each round under a different compensation scheme.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomisation will be done by a computer (coded into the program that displays the screens and compensations schemes participants see).
Randomization unit
At the individual level.
Clusters
400 individuals
Observations
400 individuals
Arms
200 females, 200 males.
Primary outcomes
Willingness to pay to avoid sabotage
Secondary outcomes
Willingness to pay to avoid competition Willingness to sabotage

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords