Monitoring Employees: A Principal-Agent Approach to Contracts, Safety and Productivity in Kenya’s Informal Public Transport Industry
How to cite
Schonholzer, David; Lane, Gregory; Kelley, Erin. 2016. "Monitoring Employees: A Principal-Agent Approach to Contracts, Safety and Productivity in Kenya’s Informal Public Transport Industry." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001482. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1482-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Asymmetric information between employers and employees is a key determinant of contractual arrangements and firm outcomes. We report on a randomized controlled trial estimating the effect of reducing information asymmetry on contracts, productivity and driver safety via a new monitoring technology in Kenya’s informal public transport industry. This industry is dominated by small-scale entrepreneurs hiring minibus (matatu) drivers on a daily basis using residual-claimant schemes to ensure effort. We fit minibuses in both the treatment and control group with monitoring devices equipped with GPS and accelerometers recording high-frequency data on productivity and safety performance of drivers. Minibus owners in the treatment group receive information on driver effort and output via smartphone app. Owners and drivers in both treatment group and control group submit daily data on business outcomes to document how contracts change and how this subsequently affects productivity and safety.
Intervention
Primary intervention: access to safety and productivity information for minibus (matatu) owners via smartphone app. Secondary intervention: cash incentives for drivers based on safe driving performance.
Experimental design
Stratified randomization across routes.
Design details
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