Morals in Markets with Network Externalities

How to cite

Cason, Timothy; Vries, Frans de. 2024. "Morals in Markets with Network Externalities." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014811. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14811-1.0

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Timothy Cason* , Frans de Vries

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014811
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14811-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-11-15 – 2025-05-09
Countries
United States of America (Indiana)
JEL codes
C91, Q5
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14811

Abstract

Climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution of air and waterways from plastics and other types of contaminants, are topical examples of major environmental problems confronting societies worldwide. In view of these environmental pressures, a debate has arisen around what constitutes a “moral economy,” and especially how markets shape socially responsible behavior. This experiment aims to enhance our economic understanding of how consumption behavior is affected by the way markets are organized. The project particularly seeks to shed light on the question to what extent the degree of market competition can effectively guide consumption of products that exhibit moral features. In the experiment, purchases of one product type will result in the real planting of trees to offset carbon emissions. The experiment will also feature consumption externalities, where buyers’ value is increasing in the number of other consumers purchasing the same product type. These types of network externalities are common for information‐technology based products, but they can also arise from moral choices such as participating in markets with environmental externalities, such as in the case of electric vehicles.

Intervention

The trading institution, either a continuous double auction or a seller posted offer, will be varied across treatments. The experiment may include a non-market baseline treatment. Although the baseline environment includes consumption externalities, the design may be extended to eliminate these externalities to determine how this affects moral consumption choices.

Experimental design

This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, recruiting students broadly across the university. Subjects will be randomly assigned to treatments, and then randomly assigned to roles (buyers or sellers) and into fixed markets. Two types of products will be available for trade with induced values and costs. The products differ in their production costs and the environmental externalities they produce, with the moral product being the higher-cost type The baseline experimental environment features consumption externalities, as the buyers’ value of purchased products in each round increases as more buyers buy units of the same type. The experiment may also include a non-market baseline, with payoffs determined by fixed seller prices.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects will be recruited by email using ORSEE. They choose between a list of available sessions, and the session is randomized to a treatment before it is initialized.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
16 markets of 11 traders each for the baseline environment
Observations
176 individuals
Arms
8 markets (88 subjects) for double auction institution 8 markets (88 subjects) for posted offer institution Additional observations for a potential non-market baseline, and for a control treatment without consumption externalities
Primary outcomes
Fraction of traded products benefiting the environment Prices of two types of products (“moral” and “immoral”), and their average price difference within markets Convergence to equilibrium product purchases (all one type or the other)
Secondary outcomes
Bid and offer behavior leading to transaction prices Buyer and seller earnings Number of trees planted and environmental benefits generated

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Keywords