Understanding reporting behavior on gang extortion: A survey experiment in Medellín
How to cite
Tobon, Santiago; Blattman, Christopher; Mesa-Mejia, Juan-Pablo. 2024. "Understanding reporting behavior on gang extortion: A survey experiment in Medellín." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014803. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14803-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This experiment is part of a yearly survey conducted in Medellin asking its citizens questions about the governance, legitimacy, and taxation of three main actors: gangs, the municipal government, and the police. As part of the survey, we are interested in knowing how often and how much gangs extort (tax) households and businesses. We are unsure whether subjects would be willing to report extortion to the authorities. In addition to collecting self-reported willingness and actual responses to a WhatsApp inquiry, we conduct survey experiments where individuals are randomly assigned to one of the three treatment groups that might increase likelihood pf reporting: a video that increases the salience of the issue to the government (and their likelihood of acting on the information); a video that articulates the size and social cost of the problem; and a control group.
Intervention
This study aims to examine the willingness of individuals to exert costly effort in reporting extortion to the authorities. Participants are divided into three distinct groups—two treatment groups and one control group—to assess the impact of varying informational interventions on their reporting behavior.
Group assignments and treatment conditions:
Control group: Participants in the control group receive no informational intervention.
Treatment group 1: Participants in the first treatment group view a video featuring the Secretary of Security. In this video, the Secretary explicitly expresses concern about extortion, emphasizes the government's commitment to addressing it, and directly encourages citizens to report instances of extortion.
Treatment group 2: Participants in the second treatment group view a video presenting quantitative data on the economic scope of extortion in the area. This video details the estimated amount of money extorted weekly, monthly, and yearly by local gangs, thus illustrating the scale and economic impact of extortion.
Experimental design
We expect our primary outcome regression to take the following form:
Y = b1 T1 + b2 T2 + b3 X + C + e
where
Y is our primary outcome
T1 is assignment to the first information treatment (commitment)
T2 is assignment to the second information treatment (fairness and magnitude)
X is a set of pre-information experiment control variables taken from survey data, selected using the double lasso method on primary outcomes
C is a set of comuna or barrio fixed effects
e is an error term (not clustered)
Design details
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