Testing Variations in the Two-Step Norm-Elicitation Procedure
How to cite
Plaß, Sabrina. 2024. "Testing Variations in the Two-Step Norm-Elicitation Procedure." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014794. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14794-1.3
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The experiment ‘Elicitation of Normative Expectations (ENE)’ examines the extent to which variations in the two-step elicitation method (e.g., Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Bicchieri et al. 2019; Görges & Nosenzo 2020) influence personal normative beliefs and normative expectations, i.e. the extent to which the elicitation method is robust to variations. To this end, each participant is asked about their personal normative beliefs and normative expectations regarding fairness in a dictator game. Three main characteristics are varied in eight different treatments: i) order of elicitation (before/after the task), ii) incentivization of normative expectations (yes/no), and iii) question on behavioural options (about fair share only/ about fair and selfish share). In addition, subjects participate in an online variation of the commonly used ‘Dictator Game’ to assess fairness. In the Dictator Game, participants are asked to divide the additional bonus amount of 2.5 GBP between themselves and another randomly selected participant. All participants will be paid the amount generated in the experiment (plus a ‘show-up fee’ of 1 GBP). The experiment will be conducted via the crowdworking platform ‘Prolific’ and is expected to last 7-8 minutes.
Experimental design
The experiment follows the structure of previous dictator games that use two-step norm-elicitation procedures (e.g. Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Xiao & Houser, 2008). Dictators can choose one of the options A-G, of which a provision of 1 GBP or 1.25 GBP (option C & D) to the receiver is referred to as a fair offer (frame between 40%-50%) and offers of 0.25 GBP or 0.5 GBP (option A & B, 20%-30%) are referred to as low share.
This study applies the strategy method, where all participants are in the role of a dictator and have to decide on a (hypothetical) option. After the decision is made, two participants are randomly paired. One is randomly chosen as the dictator, whose chosen option will be implemented, while the other becomes a receiver.
After subjects make their decisions, the experiment elicits participants’ personal normative beliefs and normative expectations (most common response) regarding the fair share (option C or D). Participants can choose whether they personally believe providing a fair share is very inappropriate, somewhat inappropriate, somewhat appropriate or very appropriate. Normative expectations are incentivized, in a way that participants will receive an additional bonus (0.25 GBP) if their answer to the question (which option do you think most of participants chose in the preceding question?) matches the correct majority answer. On the next screen, participants are asked whether they expect others to provide a fair share (yes/no, empirical expectations).
Then, three treatments will be conducted in which I implement different variations of the elicitation procedure.
Design details
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