Correlation in Voting
How to cite
Mengel, Friederike; Ruiz, Javier Rivas; Zeng, Qingchao. 2024. "Correlation in Voting." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014792. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14792-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In large elections where there is correlated information and the possibility, however small, of misinformation (i.e. that information is non-informative), information aggregation fails if voters have a non-zero, potentially negligible, idiosyncratic bias towards either party. The mechanism in play is that if a voter is pivotal, then the posterior on information is that the most likely event is that information is non-informative, regardless of how its prior probability might have been. Thus, a voter is better of voting following the bias even if it is arbitrarily small. Our experiments are designed to understand the empirical relevance of this phenomenon and the underlying mechanism.
Intervention
Group size (N=3, N=15);
Strategy Method or not;
Within subjects we vary signal accuracy and the distribution of biases.
Experimental design
Our treatment design consists of a 2x2 between subjects design. In all treatments, participants are informed about their bias and the distribution of biases in their group of voters. They then receive a signal and vote. Participants make four decisions and do not receive feedback about others’ behaviour during the experiment. Treatments differ in the group size (N=3 or N=15) and in whether the strategy method is used to elicit the vote or not. Within subjects we also vary the signal accuracy and the distribution of biases.
Design details
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