Formal Rainfall Insurance for the Informally Insured in India

How to cite

Mobarak, Ahmed; Rosenzweig, Mark. 2016. "Formal Rainfall Insurance for the Informally Insured in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001478. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1478-1.0

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Ahmed Mobarak* , Mark Rosenzweig

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001478
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1478-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2010-09-01 – 2011-07-31
Countries
India (South Asia)
JEL codes
O17, O13, O16
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1478

Abstract

I: "Selling Formal Insurance to the Informally Insured"

The take-up of insurance contracts by farmers in developing countries is puzzlingly
low, but these farmers often participate in informal risk sharing. We examine
theoretically and empirically the impact of informal risk-sharing on the demand for
index insurance, and the effects of index insurance purchase on subsequent risktaking.
In theory, informal risk sharing can crowd out demand for index insurance if
the network indemnifies rainfall risk, but it could also be a complement to index
insurance if the contract carries basis risk (i.e. mismatches between payouts and
actual losses due to the remote location of the rainfall gauge). Using field
experiments that randomize both the location of rainfall gauges and offers of index
insurance contracts to Indian farmers for whom we have detailed data on the nature
and extent of their prior community risk sharing, we find substantial support for the
theoretical predictions. Demand for index insurance is lower with greater basis risk,
but indemnification of household-specific losses by the network mitigates this effect.
Rainfall insurance enables households to take more risk even in the presence of
informal insurance.

II: "Risk, Insurance, and Wages in General Equilibrium"

We estimate the general-equilibrium labor market effects of a large-scale randomized intervention
in which we designed and marketed a rainfall index insurance product across three states in India.
Marketing agricultural insurance to both cultivators and to agricultural wage laborers allows us to
test a general-equilibrium model of wage determination in settings where households supplying labor
and households hiring labor face weather risk. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that
both labor demand and equilibrium wages become more rainfall sensitive when cultivators are offered
rainfall insurance, because insurance induces cultivators to switch to riskier, higher-yield production
methods. The same insurance contract offered to agricultural laborers smoothes wages across rainfall
states by inducing changes in labor supply. Policy simulations based on our estimates suggest that
selling insurance only to land-owning cultivators and precluding the landless from the insurance market
(which is the current regulatory practice in India and other developing countries), makes wage laborers
worse off relative to a situation where insurance does not exist at all.

Experimental design

A randomized controlled trial was conducted in order to empirically examine the relationship between the demand for rainfall index insurance. the level of informal community-based risk mitigation, and basis risk. Index insurance was marketed to a sample of jati (Indian sub-caste) members. Researchers first studied how informal risk sharing affects formal insurance take-up, and then how the random offer of index insurance (intent-to-treat) affects subsequent risk-taking. In addition to randomizing the offer of and price of the index product, automatic rainfall stations were randomly placed in a subset of the sampled villages. Contract payouts were based on rainfall measured at these stations, so a household's distance from a rainfall station is a major determinant of basis risk. The existence of basis risk in the sample was shown by estimating the relationship between the rainfall recorded at the stations and individual farmer's per-acre output. The distance variation was used to directly estimate both the effect of basis risk on index insurance demand, and whether jati-based idiosyncratic risk sharing attenuates the negative effects of basis risk on formal insurance demand.

Design details

Randomization method
The sampling frame for the marketing experiment was listing households in all 63 REDS villages in three large states: Uttar Pradesh (UP), Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Tamil Nadu (TN). Researchers randomly selected 42 of these villages for the marketing experiment, while the 21 other villages were assigned to a control group so as to preserve an unadulterated comparison sample for the analysis of the effects of being offered formal insurance on subsequent risk-taking. The experiment sampling frame was restricted to only castes that have 50 or more households represented in the REDS listing. Researchers randomly selected 5,100 of these households to receive insurance marketing treatments, stratified by type of occupation: ~300 households in occupations entirely unrelated to agriculture, ~2400 cultivator households, and ~2400 agricultural laborer households. Researchers were ultimately able to market the insurance product to 4,667 rural households in TN, AP and UP. (See section c.1 Sample Selection in "Selling Formal Insurance to the Informally Insured" for more information)
Randomization unit
Treatment was clustered on the village level. Calculations for all outcomes featured clustering on the caste level, except for "Testing for basis risk: effects on log of output value per acre" in which clustering occurred at the village level.
Clusters
63 villages
Observations
5,100 households were selected from the treatment villages to receive marketing treatments.
Arms
42 villages treatment 21 villages control
Primary outcomes
Determinants of Receiving Financial Assistance Effects of basis risk on log of output value per acre Determinants of Formal Insurance Take-up Marginal Effects of Reasons for not Purchasing Insurance Intent-to-Treat Caste Fixed-Effects Estimates of Index Insurance on Risk and Yield: Proportion of Planted Crop Varieties Rated "Good" for Drought Tolerance and Yield, Tamil Nadu Kharif Rice Farmers Reasons for Not Purchasing Insurance Village Fixed Effects Estimates: Demand for Kharif Season Labor by Cultivators by Stage of Production Village Fixed Effects Estimates: Labor Supply and Migration during Kharif Season by Landless Agricultural Wage Workers Aged 25 - 49 General Equilibrium Effects of Insurance Provision and Rainfall on Log Wages (Landless Agricultural Wage Workers Ages 20+)

Papers from this trial

  1. A. Mushfiq Mobarak and Mark Rosenzweig. "Selling Formal Insurance to the Informally Insured." 2012 https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/300_400%20Formal%20Insurance%20Nov2012.pdf
  2. Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq, and Mark Rosenzweig. "Risk, Insurance and Wages in General Equilibrium." NBER Working Paper 19811, January 2014. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/300_400%20Wages%20General%20Equilibrium%20NBER%20Jan2014.pdf

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