Too Big to Innovate? Theory and Experiment

How to cite

Wu, Mike Zhiren; Qin, Xiangdong; Jiang, Shicheng. 2024. "Too Big to Innovate? Theory and Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014778. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14778-2.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Mike Zhiren Wu* , Xiangdong Qin , Shicheng Jiang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014778
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14778-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-12-04 – 2025-09-30
Countries
China (Shanghai)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14778

Abstract

The evidence on whether small or large firms hold an advantage in innovation remains mixed. This paper revisits this question by combining lab experiments with theory to explain the "firm size effect" on innovation. We consider a setting where the principal chooses between a rigid, risk-free project, providing all agents with a uniform payoff, and a flexible, riskier project (with an option to revert to the risk-free project after observing outcomes), which offers potentially higher payoffs for each agent with a certain probability. Some agents (who fail the risky project or suffer a loss due to the principal) may perceive the principal as unfair, leading them to engage in costly punishment or "shading", directed at the principal and other agents. This act cannot be contractually prohibited ex-ante. We hypothesize that shading is more likely to occur in larger firms, generating more resistance to innovation. To reduce the potential shading, we test whether screening out agents with strong shading motives ex ante or team building activities can foster firm innovation.

Experimental design

Before the main experiment, subjects complete a real-effort task to earn initial endowments (200 ECUs) to ensure they have non-negative payoffs.

The main experiment includes three different treatments, each with a different group size (N=4, 6, or 8). Each group consists of one principal (P) and multiple agents (A), with roles randomly assigned at the start and maintained throughout the experiment.

The timeline is as follows: At the beginning each round, the principal must choose between a risk-free project (project 1) and a risky project (project 2). If the project 1 is chosen, both the principal and the agents can secure a payoff of 100 experiment currency units (ECUs, henceforth). If the project 2 is chosen, with two-thirds of the probability, an agent may succeed in the project and gets a payoff of 200 ECUs. With one-third of the probability, the agent may failure in the project and gets nothing. The principal’s payoff will be the average payoff of the agents. After checking the performance of each agent, the principal can decide whether to revert to the risk-free option by switching back to the project 1. Regardless of the choice of the principal (whether it is project 1/project 2/ project 2 → project 1), each agent is given the opportunity to impose costly punishment on others (“shading”). An agent can spend 5 ECUs to reduce the payoff of the principal or all other agents (with positive payoff) by 50 ECUs, or spend 10 ECUs to reduce the payoff of both the principal and all other agents (with positive payoff) by 50 ECUs. The game is repeated for 10 rounds and only one round is randomly selected to calculate the final payoff.

In addition to examining whether larger firms may face greater challenges in pursuing risky investment or innovation, we also explore mechanisms to address these challenges. To achieve this, we run two additional treatments (group size = 6), each representing a different team management strategy. In the "screening" treatment, a simple game is used to differentiate agents by testing whether they are willing to bear costs to reduce income inequality when treated unfairly. Based on this game, groups are formed by pairing a randomly selected principal with five agents with weak shading motives. This allows us to test whether recruiting agents with weaker shading motives enhances firm innovation. In the "team building" treatment, we adapt a team building task from Jiang and Li (2019). In the randomly formed group with N=6, the principal and the five agents need to exchange their private information via group chat to solve a puzzle together, with the principal taking on the main responsibility in the solving the puzzle. Each group member receives a small reward if the puzzle is solved within the given time. We are interested in whether strengthened closeness between the principal and the agents promotes firm innovation.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by the computer. We randomly assign students into different treatments.
Randomization unit
individual level randomization
Clusters
Around 220 groups in total
Observations
around 1320 subjects (university students)
Arms
Around 40 groups for treatment with group size = 4, 6, 8 Around 60 groups for treatment with group size = 6 (with type classification) Around 40 groups for treatment with group size = 6 (with team building)
Primary outcomes
project carried out by the principal - initial choice (rigid, risk-free project / flexible, risky project) adjustment made by the principal following the outcome of the risky project ex-post punishment decision ("shading") of the agents

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords