A Lab-in-the Field Experiment on Incentivized Group Leaders in Joint-Liability Group Loans
How to cite
Uras, Burak; Cecchi, Francesco; Carli, Francesco; Fritz, Manuela; Lensink, Robert. 2024. "A Lab-in-the Field Experiment on Incentivized Group Leaders in Joint-Liability Group Loans." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014732. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14732-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
While joint-liability and group lending has long been at the core of microfinance, recent evidence
suggests that these terms have not fulfilled their promise of reducing loan defaults and operational
costs. Since borrowers commonly face symmetric contract terms, group members are subject to
coordination and free-riding problems. Peers might enforce each other to repay their loans, but might
also free-ride or jointly default. We propose that asymmetric joint-liability microfinance loans are a
suitable instrument to increase repayment rates and decrease loan defaults of microfinance clients. In
such asymmetric contracts, one borrower will become an optimally incentivized lead-borrower
(group-leader) through asymmetric interest rates, which is expected to increase monitoring efforts and
thereby reduce moral hazard of all group members. We rely on the theoretical model of Carli & Uras
(2017) for a lending scenario with ex-ante moral hazard and develop a new theoretical model for a
lending scenario of ex-post moral hazard. We then empirically test both models through a lab-in-the-
field experiments with Bolivian microfinance clients.
Intervention
We design two versions of a Microfinance Lab Game: The Investment Game and the Repayment
Game. The Investment Game corresponds to a lending scenario with ex-ante moral hazard, the
Repayment Game corresponds to a lending scenario with ex-post moral hazard. These games imitate
the investment, repayment and monitoring decisions that microfinance clients face in reality. For both
games, we design a control setting, where individuals are subject to joint-liability under symmetric contracts, and a treatment setting,
in which individuals are subject to joint-liability under asymmetric
contract terms. The asymmetry refers to the interest rate that individuals are expected to pay.
Specifically, the asymmetric contract terms specify that the group leader repays the loan with a lower
interest in case of all group members repaying the loan. The lower interest rate is based on the
argument that one member thereby becomes an optimally incentivized lead-borrower, who is expected
to increase monitoring efforts and thereby reduce moral hazard of all group members, which also has
long-run implications for the bank’s profits and overall social welfare.
Together with the Bolivian microfinance institution IDEPRO IFD, we will invite their clients to
participate in the game sessions, which will last about 2 hours.
Experimental design
Investment Game:
In the Investment Game, two (randomly matched) players form a joint-liability group and receive a
loan from the bank (MFI) which they have to repay with an interest. Each player has to decide
whether to invest the loan in a safe project or a risky project with a private benefit. In case the project
is successful, the earnings are such that the loan with interest can be repaid. There is asymmetric
information in that the MFI cannot observe behavior of the borrowers. However, repayment can be
enforced, conditional on the project being successful. That is, the MFI can observe whether the
project was successful. In case only one player’s project is successful, the successful player is
enforced to partially cover the group members’ outstanding loan. In case both projects are not
successful, the group defaults. Within joint liability groups there is also no perfect information, i.e.
members do not observe each other’s investment decisions. However, players can monitor each other,
which is costly, but ensures that the monitored player can only invest in the safe project.
In the groups assigned to the control setting, both players face identical interest rates. In the groups
assigned to the treatment setting, one player is randomly assigned as the group leader, who faces a
lower interest rate, conditional on both projects being successful.
Each group will play four independent rounds of the investment game. Decisions will be indicated by
the players through game cards (an investment card and a monitoring card), which are unobservable
for other group members, but will be recorded on tablets by trained enumerators. In terms of
decisions, we focus on the investment choice and the monitoring decision. These result in a final
investment action that may or may not constitute ex-ante moral hazard.
Repayment Game:
In the Repayment Game, two (randomly matched) players form a joint-liability group and receive a
loan from the bank which they have to repay with an interest. The loan is automatically invested in a
project that can be successful (high outcome) or fail (low outcome). In case the project is successful,
the players can repay their loan and interest to the bank. In case the project is not successful, they
cannot repay. Before learning about the project outcome, players individually decide whether to
reveal an eventual positive outcome, and thus repay their loan or not in case their investment is
successful. In case both players repay, both pay only their share of the loan. In case only one repays,
the repaying player automatically pays the full outstanding loan, including the share of the group
member. In case none repays, the group defaults. There is asymmetric information in the sense that
the MFI cannot verify project outcomes. However, the loan has a dynamic incentive, i.e. whenever the
full loan is repaid (either by two players jointly or by one player), both have access to another loan in
the next round. In case of default, both will not receive another loan in the next round. Within joint
liability groups there is also no perfect information, i.e. members do not observe each other’s project
outcomes. However, players can monitor each other, which is costly, but ensures that players cannot
“lie”, i.e. repayment is enforced, conditional on the player’s project being successful.
In the groups assigned to the control setting, both players face identical interest rates. In the groups
assigned to the treatment setting, one player is randomly assigned as the group leader, who faces a
lower interest rate, conditional on both players repaying their loan.
Each group will play a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 4 rounds of the Repayment Game,
conditional on repayment in the previous round (dynamic incentive). Decisions will be indicated by
the players through game cards (a repayment card and a monitoring card), which are unobservable for
other group members, but will be recorded on tablets by trained enumerators. In terms of decisions,
we focus on the repayment choice and the monitoring decision. These result in a final repayment
action that may or may not constitute ex-post moral hazard.
Design details
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