Supervisors’ reactions to penalty contracts
How to cite
Essl, Andrea; Kaeser, Michèle; Bieberstein, Frauke von; Schumacher, Stefanie. 2024. "Supervisors’ reactions to penalty contracts." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014725. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14725-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study aims to investigate the impact of bonus and penalty contracts on supervisors' reactions in the context of subjective performance evaluations. While subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to decide on variable bonus payments, research suggests that these evaluations are often biased upwards. Simultaneously, literature indicates that framing incentive contracts as penalties rather than bonuses is an effective way to motivate employees to exert more effort, due to loss aversion. Our study aims to bridge these two previously unconnected literature strands. We hypothesize that supervisors are even more lenient when employees work under a penalty contract compared to a bonus contract. Reasons, for example, may be that supervisors empathize with their employees, are afraid of adverse reactions by their employees, or do not want to harm their own self-image. To test our hypothesis, we conduct a lab experiment applying a principal-agent setting. Participants in the role of agents perform a real effort task, while those in the role of principals benefit from the agents' work and assess their performance.
Intervention
The intervention in this study operates within a principal-agent framework, where participants are randomly assigned either a bonus or penalty contract (between-subject design). Agents work on a real effort task. Agents’ possible effort levels are quantified in points reached in the real effort task and grouped into categories. Supervisors benefit financially from each point achieved by their assigned agent. Supervisors evaluate agents across effort categories. In the bonus treatment, supervisors determine whether the agent receives a bonus or not for each effort category. In the penalty treatment, agents receive an upfront payment and supervisors determine whether the agent must pay a penalty or not for each effort category. Importantly, the financial incentives are equivalent across both treatments. The key distinction lies in the framing: receiving a low (high) payment in the beginning and a potential bonus (penalty) later.
To investigate whether supervisors' evaluation behavior is influenced by reciprocity considerations, the study also employs a within-subject design involving two treatments. In one treatment, agents have the option to reward or penalize the supervisor in response to their subjective performance evaluation. In the other treatment, this option is absent. This design allows for a nuanced examination of how the presence or absence of reciprocity options may impact supervisors' rating behaviors in the context of the described bonus and penalty contracts.
Experimental design
To shed light onto the interplay between framed incentive contracts and subjective performance evaluation, we will conduct a laboratory experiment comprising five parts and a survey. Participants will act in a principal agent setting. Thus, there are two different roles: agent (employee) and principal (supervisor). Participants will remain in the same role throughout the experiments and will be paired with a player from the other role. Notably, in Parts 2 through 5, each participant in the role of the agent will be randomly matched with one other participant in the role of the principal, following a perfect-stranger design.
In Part 1, participants in the role of the agent will work on a real effort task to familiarize them with the task. In Parts 2 and 3, participants are randomly assigned either a bonus or penalty contract. In the bonus treatment, agents perform the same real effort task as in Part 1 and receive a bonus or not based on their supervisors’ evaluation. In the penalty treatment, agents receive an upfront payment before starting to work on the real effort task, and the supervisors' decisions determine whether they have to pay a penalty or not. The incentives are financially equivalent in both treatments. The only distinction between the treatments lies in how they are framed (receiving a low (high) payment in the beginning and a potential bonus (penalty) based on the supervisors’ decision later). To elicit supervisors’ evaluation behavior, we will implement the strategy method. I.e. for each effort category, which reflects the various possible effort levels in the real effort task, supervisors make a binary decision: whether the agent receives a bonus (must pay a penalty) or not.
To assess whether supervisors’ evaluation behavior is driven by reciprocity considerations, participants undergo a within-subject design in Parts 2 and 3: in one part, agents will have the option to reward or punish the supervisor as a reaction to their subjective performance evaluation, and in the other part, this option will be absent. We will randomize whether the reward/punishment option will be implemented in Part 2 or in Part 3. One of these parts will be randomly chosen for payment.
Further, we measure the time the supervisors take for their decisions in Part 2 and Part 3.
In addition, we will elicit supervisors’ and employees’ beliefs of the expected rating behavior. Belief elicitation will be incentivized.
In Part 4, we will assess agents’ loss aversion and supervisors’ loss aversion for other peoples’ payments. In Part 5, participants play a dictator game with the supervisors in the role of the dictator.
Supervisors will complete a survey on self-report scales (risk aversion, self-image concerns, empathy, personality traits) and answer demographic questions. Employees will also complete a survey on risk aversion and demographic questions.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.