The Welfare Effects of Beneficiary Control over the Timing of Cash Transfers
How to cite
Karachiwalla, Naureen; Francis; Kerwin, Jason; Annan, Francis. 2024. "The Welfare Effects of Beneficiary Control over the Timing of Cash Transfers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014679. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14679-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
To exit poverty, income streams of the poor must align with their liquidity needs (e.g., large investments, consumption-smoothing, saving for shocks, and smaller expenses). Traditional cash transfer programs lack flexibility, offering only fixed payment structures. This project will measure the demand for, and the welfare impacts of, the choice of a fully flexible payment schedule (frequency, timing, and amounts) in partnership with the Government of Ghana's Livelihood Against Poverty (LEAP) Program.
First, we will randomize 800 (of 1,500) households into a control group (C) and 700 to a treatment group will receive cash transfers (T). Next, we will elicit beneficiary preferences over preferred times and amounts of cash transfers and measure respondents' willingness to accept (WTA) switching to the LEAP default timing instead (equal, bi-monthly transfers) using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. The BDM mechanism will determine whether a household belongs to one of two treatment groups with the following distribution programs (equal in total value): (T1) smooth, bi-monthly transfers (LEAP default) vs. (T2) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides choice over the timing of transfers. Impacts will be assessed on subjective well-being, consumption expenditures (we will use this to derive marginal utility of expenditures (MUEs) following Ligon (2020) and the treatment’s welfare effects), income, assets, savings and debt, women’s empowerment, and mental health. We will further explore whether liquidity or risk drive these impacts by stratifying treatments on village “financial health” (low, medium, high) (Innovations for Poverty Action IPA 2020).
After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the control vs treatment groups and the two treatments to one another (the lump-sum and fully-flexible programs), we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either commitment and self-control motives or consumption self-insurance motives. All households will receive cash transfers. Households will be randomized into a control group receiving no additional programming, a group that will additionally receive an insurance product, a group that will additionally receive a a savings product, and a group that will additionally receive both insurance and savings products. The outcomes will be the same as the main experiment.
This project will thus involve three parts (each with a different pre-analysis plan to be uploaded separately):
1. Measurement and analysis of the respondent's willingness to accept LEAP's default schedule instead of the elicited preferred schedule.
2. Randomized trial with a control group and two experimental groups (fully flexible schedule and bi-monthly equal transfers) with associated analysis.
3. Randomized mechanism experiment providing a free savings or insurance product in addition to the cash transfers.
Intervention
The LEAP program is the Government of Ghana’s national cash transfer program and began in 2008. It provides transfers to the ultra-poor based on the number of eligible individuals in the household. Vulnerable household members include orphaned and vulnerable children, people with severe disability without any productive capacity, extremely poor or vulnerable households with pregnant women and mothers with infants, and members 65 years and above. Beneficiary selection begins with data from the Ghana Statistical Service for national poverty maps, followed by geographical targeting of districts who have the highest poverty rates, and finally household enumeration using a proxy-means testing questionnaire.
A household with one eligible member receives GH₵512.00, two eligible members receives GH₵608.00, three eligible members receives GH₵704.00, and four or more eligible members receives GH₵848.00. Payments are made electronically (via biometric fingerprints) bi-monthly in equal installments. To remain eligible, households must enroll school-aged children in school, enroll all members in the national health insurance scheme, and children 0-18 months must be registered with the Birth and Deaths Registry, attend required post-natal clinics and complete the Expanded Programme on Immunisation. For the main experiment, the transfers will run for one year and will either be the LEAP default bi-monthly, equal transfers or the beneficiary's preferred transfer scheduled (as determined by the BDM mechanism).
For the mechanism experiment, the same program will be used, but amounts may differ should the Government of Ghana decide. The precise savings and insurance products will be determined at a later date.
Experimental design
First, we will randomize 800 (of 1,500) households into a control group (C) and 700 to a treatment group will receive cash transfers (T). During the baseline, we will elicit beneficiary preferences over preferred times and amounts of cash transfers and measure respondents' willingness to accept (WTA) switching to the LEAP default timing instead (equal, bi-monthly transfers) using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. The BDM mechanism will determine whether a household belongs to one of two treatment groups with the following distribution programs (equal in total value): (T1) smooth, bi-monthly transfers (LEAP default) vs. (T2) fully-flexible payment schedule that provides choice over the timing of transfers. Respondents will state their maximum WTA to switch away from their preferred schedule, and a spinning wheel will provide a random amount of money between 0-690 GHC. If the respondent's WTA is lower than the amount spun, they will receive their preferred timing schedule, otherwise, they will switch to the LEAP default schedule.
We will collect data using a comprehensive baseline survey prior to the cash transfers, a comprehensive endline survey once the cash transfers are complete, and a set of high-frequency phone surveys while the cash transfers are ongoing. The phone surveys are very brief and will track the following outcomes: poverty scorecard, consumption expenditures (food, utilities, personal care, education, healthcare, durables, total), subjective well-being, and inflation perceptions.
Impacts will be assessed on subjective well-being, consumption expenditures (we will use this to derive marginal utility of expenditures (MUEs) following Ligon (2020) and the treatment’s welfare effects), income, assets, savings and debt, women’s empowerment, and mental health. We will further explore whether liquidity or risk drive these impacts by stratifying treatments on village “financial health” (low, medium, high) (Innovations for Poverty Action IPA 2020).
After evaluating the main effects at endline by comparing the LEAP default vs. fully-flexible timing, we plan to later implement a mechanism experiment to causally test whether the main effects are explained by either commitment and self-control motives or consumption self-insurance motives. All households will receive cash transfers. Households will be randomized into a control group receiving no additional programming, a group that will additionally receive an insurance product, a group that will additionally receive a a savings product, and a group that will additionally receive both insurance and savings products. The outcomes will be the same as the main experiment.
Design details
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