The Role of Communication and Deniability in Managerial Overinvestment

How to cite

Lightle, John; Korenok, Oleg; Davis, Douglas. 2024. "The Role of Communication and Deniability in Managerial Overinvestment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014678. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14678-1.0

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John Lightle* , Oleg Korenok , Douglas Davis

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014678
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14678-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-11-04 – 2025-11-03
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14678

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the role of deniability and communication in reducing managerial overinvestment. Managers often have private information about the profitability of a particular investment, and capital markets may assume that the investment itself indicates that the manager's information was favorable. In this case, managers who value the share price of their firm have an incentive to overinvest, i.e. to make an investment even when the net present value of the investment is negative. In our experiment, managers make investment decisions and traders can buy or sell shares of the firm. Overinvestment is the unique equilibrium of the one-shot game, but in a repeated setting it can also be an equilibrium to make efficient investment choices. We experimentally vary whether managers can communicate their investment plans to traders, and whether managers can credibly deny that an inefficient investment was due to bad luck rather than a deliberate misrepresentation of the manager's intentions. We hypothesize that the introduction of communication will reduce overinvestment by managers, and the effect will be stronger when lies are detectable as opposed to the treatments where lies are deniable.

Experimental design

We will have a 2x2 factorial design where we vary communication (Comm, No Comm) and the quality of manager's private information about the profitability of investment (Perfect, Imperfect). We will use a between-subjects design with participants in only one of the four treatment cells.

Design details

Randomization method
Assignment to treatments will occur randomly using the recruitment software ORSEE by Ben Greiner.
Randomization unit
Randomization will occur at the individual level as they agree to participate in the experiment.
Clusters
There is a single cluster of participants and that is the students at VCU who have volunteered to participate in economic experiments.
Observations
Approximately 240 experimental subjects are planned, each with up to 50 (non-independent) observations.
Arms
60 subjects in No Communication x Perfect 60 subjects in Communication x Perfect 60 subjects in No Communication x Imperfect 60 subjects in Communication x Imperfect
Primary outcomes
The investment decisions of managers in our experiment, and the actions of traders.

Cited by

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Keywords