Consumer Preferences for Antibiotic-Treated Citrus: An Experiment Using GSO and BDM Mechanisms.

How to cite

Badio, Levenson. 2024. "Consumer Preferences for Antibiotic-Treated Citrus: An Experiment Using GSO and BDM Mechanisms.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014656. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14656-1.0

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Levenson Badio*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014656
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14656-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-12-17 – 2025-03-03
Countries
Private
JEL codes
Agriculture, economics, experimental economics
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14656

Abstract

This study will address two interconnected challenges in consumer research: the methodological question of eliciting consumer valuations that are in line with market and the practical issue of consumer acceptance for antibiotic-treated citrus. As the U.S. citrus industry battles Huanglongbing (HLB), understanding consumer reactions to antibiotic treatments is crucial. We propose a novel experimental design comparing Game Structure Obvious (GSO) and Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanisms in eliciting consumer willingness to pay for antibiotic-treated citrus. Additionally, we will examine how information about disease severity affects consumer support for antibiotic treatment in citrus production. This study extends recent theoretical work on preference elicitation mechanisms to field settings while providing actionable insights for agricultural policy and public health regarding antibiotic use in crop production.

Intervention

This study will address two interconnected challenges in consumer research: the methodological question of eliciting consumer valuations that are in line with market and the practical issue of consumer acceptance for antibiotic-treated citrus. As the U.S. citrus industry battles Huanglongbing (HLB), understanding consumer reactions to antibiotic treatments is crucial. We propose to test a novel experimental design comparing Game Structure Obvious (GSO) as compared to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanisms and explore which one lead to preference elicitation that is more in line with the market and preference revelation. Additionally, we will examine how information about disease severity affects consumer support for antibiotic treatment in citrus production. This study extends recent theoretical work on preference elicitation mechanisms to field settings while providing actionable insights for agricultural policy and public health regarding antibiotic use in crop production.

Experimental design

The experiment employs a 2×2 between-subjects full factorial design with three factors: elicitation method (BDM vs GSO), reward type (hypothetical vs real). In addition, we will also present within-subject information provision (no information vs information about citrus greening) before the third round.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization will be done by a computer and the software program (Qualtrics).
Randomization unit
The randomization unit is at the individual level.
Clusters
We will not use cluster.
Observations
295 subjects/treatment*4 treatment x 3 rounds x 2 products = 7080 observations
Arms
Our study will include a sample size of 295 participants per treatment group, resulting in a minimum total sample of 1180 participants across all four groups (295 participants * 4 groups).
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is willingness to pay (WTP) for oranges from trees treated with antibiotics as compared to conventional oranges. We will additionally explore the impact of information provision on consumers WTP for
Secondary outcomes
As secondary outcome, we will measure game form recognition using questions measuring understanding of each of the two mechanisms (BDM vs GSO).

Cited by

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Keywords