Myopic Loss Aversion In Groups

How to cite

Feldman, Paul. 2024. "Myopic Loss Aversion In Groups." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014598. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14598-1.1

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Paul Feldman*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014598
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14598-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-09-20 – 2024-11-08
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D81, G11, C92
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14598

Abstract

Most people instinctively chase losses, hoping to recover them—a behavior called myopic loss aversion, where we focus on immediate losses over long-term gains. Our study explored whether groups show this same bias using an investment game. Participants played individually and in pairs across two scenarios: one group faced their losses after each round, while the other continued without directly confronting losses. All participants first played alone, making investment choices with real money at stake, then played in pairs with collective decision-making. We expect to find myopic loss aversion in both individual and group settings, though with varying intensity.

Experimental design

The experiment employs a mixed design where participants engage in decision-making tasks both individually and in groups. Participants are assigned to one of two loss conditions: paper losses (hypothetical losses not immediately realized) or realized losses (actual losses that affect their budget). The experiment is conducted over multiple rounds, with each participant initially making individual investment decisions, followed by rounds in a group setting.
Participants begin by making investment decisions in four rounds under either the paper or realized loss condition. Each round presents them with the option to invest a portion of their endowment in a risky lottery with a known probability of success and failure. The amount invested in the lottery is the key variable, and the payoff structure is clearly defined to simulate realistic financial decisions. Following these rounds, participants are randomly paired into groups of two, and the experiment is repeated for an additional four rounds. Groups are allowed to communicate with each other, and they must reach a consensus on their investment decisions.
The experiment design allows for a within-subject comparison between individual and group decisions, as well as a between-subject comparison of the effects of realized versus paper losses. By comparing investment behavior before and after group interaction, the experiment seeks to isolate the effects of social dynamics on MLA. The group interaction component, which involves open communication between participants, is critical in testing whether groups can collectively mitigate the impact of MLA, leading to more rational, long-term decision-making.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
The primary randomization unit is the individual participant, and there is an additional layer of randomization when participants are assigned to groups of 2 for the group decision-making rounds.
Clusters
85 groups
Observations
We aim to recruit approximately 170 participants.
Arms
85 for both paper loss and realized loss treatment
Primary outcomes
The main outcome is the amount invested in a risky option during each round of decision-making. This is a continuous variable measured as the proportion of the participant's endowment allocated to a risky investment.

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Keywords