Myopic Loss Aversion In Groups
How to cite
Feldman, Paul. 2024. "Myopic Loss Aversion In Groups." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014598. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14598-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Most people instinctively chase losses, hoping to recover them—a behavior called myopic loss aversion, where we focus on immediate losses over long-term gains. Our study explored whether groups show this same bias using an investment game. Participants played individually and in pairs across two scenarios: one group faced their losses after each round, while the other continued without directly confronting losses. All participants first played alone, making investment choices with real money at stake, then played in pairs with collective decision-making. We expect to find myopic loss aversion in both individual and group settings, though with varying intensity.
Experimental design
The experiment employs a mixed design where participants engage in decision-making tasks both individually and in groups. Participants are assigned to one of two loss conditions: paper losses (hypothetical losses not immediately realized) or realized losses (actual losses that affect their budget). The experiment is conducted over multiple rounds, with each participant initially making individual investment decisions, followed by rounds in a group setting.
Participants begin by making investment decisions in four rounds under either the paper or realized loss condition. Each round presents them with the option to invest a portion of their endowment in a risky lottery with a known probability of success and failure. The amount invested in the lottery is the key variable, and the payoff structure is clearly defined to simulate realistic financial decisions. Following these rounds, participants are randomly paired into groups of two, and the experiment is repeated for an additional four rounds. Groups are allowed to communicate with each other, and they must reach a consensus on their investment decisions.
The experiment design allows for a within-subject comparison between individual and group decisions, as well as a between-subject comparison of the effects of realized versus paper losses. By comparing investment behavior before and after group interaction, the experiment seeks to isolate the effects of social dynamics on MLA. The group interaction component, which involves open communication between participants, is critical in testing whether groups can collectively mitigate the impact of MLA, leading to more rational, long-term decision-making.
Design details
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